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• Flatlining fossils
• Clean-energy growth matches power demand
• Which states led the clean-power shift?
• Fall in oil and gas consumption continues
• Rapid emission growth from heavy industry continues
• New investments in coal 
• Outlook for India’s emissions
• About the data

A surge in clean energy has kept carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in check across India’s power sector, with no growth from the first half of 2024 to the same period in 2026.

This guest post is by:

Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) 

Anubha Aggarwal, India analyst at CREA

This is the first time in more than 50 years that there has been no growth in India’s coal power over a two-year period, even as electricity demand grew overall.

At the same time, both oil and gas consumption have fallen across the nation for two years in a row, helping alleviate the shock of the Hormuz crisis.

Nevertheless, the new six-monthly analysis for Carbon Brief shows that India’s emissions grew by 3.7% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, due to increases from steel, cement and other sectors.

Other key findings for the first half of 2026 include:

• India’s power-sector emissions flatlined at 2024 levels, after a 2.2% decline in the first half of 2025 and a 2.3% rise in the same period this year.
• Clean energy met all of the 7% rise in India’s electricity demand over the two years, adding 63 terawatt hours (TWh), equivalent to the total demand of Switzerland.
• India has added 77 gigawatts (GW) of solar in this two-year period, helping meet 60% of the rise in electricity demand overall.
• While fossil-fuel generation stagnated, generators added 8.5GW of new coal capacity, leading to fewer running hours and increased costs to electricity consumers.
• CO2 emissions from oil and gas fell by 7% year-on-year, extending a reduction that began in 2025, despite higher demand for road transport fuels.
• Steel and cement emissions grew by 8% year-on-year, reaching a 23% share of India’s total CO2 in the first half of 2026. 

If the pace of India’s clean-energy expansion is to continue, it will need to upgrade its electricity grid, rapidly build out energy storage and boost the flexibility of coal power.

While clean-energy expansion is covering most or all of India’s power-demand growth, the fossil-fuel industry continues to pursue major capital investments.

This includes large amounts of new coal-power capacity, ambitious plans for the conversion of coal-to-chemicals and efforts to boost domestic coking coal production for the steel sector.

While CO2 output from the power sector is flat, with oil and gas in decline, India’s emissions still went up due to the contribution from industry.

India lags behind its competitors – including most large emerging economies – when it comes to electrifying its industrial sector.

Faster progress would enable clean electricity to substitute for fossil fuels in industry, as well as for power, offering the potential for India to cut its emissions overall.

Flatlining fossils

Last year, India’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement grew at their slowest pace in two decades, according to previous analysis for Carbon Brief.

This sharp slowdown was due to rapid clean-energy growth and flat oil demand, combined with rising emissions from steel and cement.

The first half of 2026 marks a continuation of these trends.

Most strikingly, the ongoing surge in clean-energy generation means that emissions have flatlined in India’s power sector for two years, as shown in the figure below.

Power-sector CO2 was the same in the first half of 2026 as two years earlier, with a small decline in 2025 having been reversed over the same period this year.

For further details, see: About the data.

Beyond electricity generation, India’s key emitting sectors continued to see divergent trends in the first half of 2026, as some saw ongoing decline while others reached new heights.

This is shown in the figure below, which compares year-on-year changes in emissions during the first half of 2026 with the same periods in 2025, 2024 and the average for 2021-23.

Specifically, emissions grew by 2.3% in the power sector, reversing last year’s decline, while demand for gas and oil products fell for another year.

The biggest increases were for steel and cement, where emissions growth accelerated to 8% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, well above the recent trend.

For further details, see: About the data. Clean-energy growth matches power demand

The period from the first half of 2024 to the first half of 2026 saw the largest increase in non-fossil power generation on record in India.

This enabled fossil-fuel consumption and CO2 emissions from the sector to stay flat, even as electricity consumption increased.

Indeed, this is the first time in more than 50 years that there has been no growth in coal power over a two-year period, even as electricity demand grew overall, as shown below.

For further details, see: About the data.

Over this two-year period, India’s total power generation increased by 7%, some 63TWh, equal to the total consumption of Singapore or Switzerland.

The additional power requirement of 63TWh was met entirely by clean energy. Solar grew by 44TWh, alongside growth from wind (13TWh), nuclear (7TWh) and hydro (8TWh).

Together, clean-energy sources added 70TWh over two years, more than the net increase in demand.

(For comparison, China’s nuclear, wind and solar output increased by 485TWh in 2025.)

The figure below shows that new investments are more than sufficient to maintain this trend, as added power generation from new clean power capacity has stayed above average demand growth for the past 18 months.

For further details, see: About the data.

Over the past two years, India added 77GW of new solar capacity, 11GW of wind, 5GW of hydro and 0.6GW of nuclear capacity.

Solar power continues to dominate clean-energy growth, but, collectively, the other non-fossil sources still contributed 40% of the overall increase in generation. 

One factor in electricity demand growth in 2026 is the El Niño, which delayed the monsoon and intensified heatwaves, driving up cooling demand.  

India is accelerating investment in energy storage, which will support further growth in clean power. The National Electricity Plan projected a requirement of 82 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of energy storage capacity by 2026-27 and 411GWh by 2031-32.

As of May 2026, the government has issued tenders for around 272GWh of energy storage capacity, including 142GWh of pumped hydro and 133GWh of battery storage systems. Current capacity is 7.5GWh of battery storage and around 60GWh of pumped hydro.

Which states led the clean-power shift?

The fall in power generation from fossil fuels from the first half of 2024 to the same period in 2026 was concentrated in a few states.

Gujarat saw both the largest reduction in fossil-fuel generation and the largest expansion in clean power, as shown in the figure below.

For further details, see: About the data.

After Gujarat, the largest increases in clean-power generation were seen in Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu, which also saw reductions in power generation from fossil fuels.

Several other states saw declines in fossil-fuel generation due to higher net imports, rather than local clean power. These included Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Punjab. 

Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh also succeeded in increasing clean-power generation faster than power demand, thereby contributing to keeping fossil fuel-based power generation stable nationwide across the two-year period. However, they exported much of the increase and consequently saw local increases in power generation from fossil fuels.

The two states with the largest increases in power demand, Maharashtra and Telangana, managed to almost match the rise with growth in clean-power generation.

Fall in oil and gas consumption continues

India’s oil consumption continued to fall during the first half of 2026, dropping 1.3% year-on-year, a slight acceleration from the 0.7% reduction in the same period last year.

While diesel and petrol consumption continued to grow, oil consumption was pulled down overall by declines in liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), petcoke (a solid derivative of oil used in the cement industry) and industrial feedstocks. Growth of aviation fuel use eased.

Diesel consumption growth accelerated from 1.8% to 4.1% in the first half of the year, supported by higher freight movement and increased agricultural demand, as the delayed monsoon led to greater use of diesel-powered irrigation.

Petrol consumption returned to growth, increasing 6.9% year-on-year after zero growth in the same period in 2025, reflecting sustained growth in passenger and two-wheeler mobility.

A significant increase in ethanol blending shaved a full percentage point off the growth of petrol consumption. India achieved its 20% ethanol blending target five years ahead of schedule in 2025-26. (Ethanol blending has faced public opposition.)

Electric vehicle (EV) adoption in India is also gaining momentum, with EVs adopted in a widening range of categories.

In Delhi, an EV policy was launched to accelerate electrification of the vehicle fleet, with a particular focus on two-wheelers, three-wheelers (auto rickshaws), commercial vehicles and high-mileage segments, alongside expanded charging infrastructure. Higher EV adoption rates will moderate the growth in emissions from petrol consumption in India. 

In contrast, aviation fuel demand growth slowed down from 5% to 2%. The slowdown coincided with the strait of Hormuz and wider crisis, which disrupted international aviation through temporary airspace closures and flight cancellations to several Middle Eastern destinations. Elevated aviation fuel prices also increased airline operating costs, contributing to lower fuel demand. 

LPG consumption contracted by 7%, after 5.7% growth in the same period last year, amid disruptions in global LPG markets following the Hormuz crisis.

Petcoke consumption fell 9.9%, more than reversing a 9.3% increase in the same period last year. Rising petcoke prices encouraged cement manufacturers to switch to coal.

Consumption of other petroleum products continued to drop, although the pace of decline moderated from 14% in 2025 to 9% in 2026. 

Industrial feedstock use was affected by shortages and price increases.

Naphtha demand contracted as import prices nearly doubled and domestic prices increased by around 60%, prompting petrochemical manufacturers to reduce operating rates and suppress demand for imported naphtha.

Bitumen consumption remained subdued due to slower road construction, driven by persistent land acquisition challenges and higher bitumen costs.

Meanwhile, higher light diesel oil (LDO) prices and shortage of LPG led some industrial consumers to switch back to furnace oil in boilers and heaters, despite the higher air pollutant emissions. Supply of fuel oil to industry increased for the same reason.

Rapid emission growth from heavy industry continues

Steel and cement output in India grew by 8% and 9%, respectively, year-on-year in the first half of 2026, despite rising input prices and weakening profitability.

The growth in steel and cement was supported in part by increased investment in India’s real estate sector, especially in the second quarter. Steel consumption growth outpaced production, implying that inventories built up last year were tapped.

Despite domestic demand growth, profit margins of Indian steel and cement manufacturers remained under pressure for much of the period due to elevated raw material costs – particularly imported coking coal – and higher freight costs stemming from the Hormuz crisis.  

The pressure on prices could dampen growth. Cement prices are expected to rise to levels last seen in the 2021-22 financial year, when Russia’s decision to cut back gas exports to Europe drove a sharp increase in fossil-fuel prices.

Outside the steel, cement and power sectors, coal-consumption growth accelerated to 14% in the first half of 2026, up from 3% last year, as the LPG shortage prompted a shift to coal.

Gas shortages resulted in some additional burning of coal for cooking in March and April. The government officially authorised the hospitality industry to use coal, refuse-derived fuel pellets, biomass and kerosene for one month.

The ceramic and tile industry also requested that the government allow the use of coal gasifiers amid the gas shortage. State governments including Delhi NCR, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Maharashtra also allowed industries to temporarily use alternative fuels, including coal. 

India’s industrial energy use is dominated by fossil fuels, particularly coal. Indian industry has the second-lowest electrification rate in the G20, as shown in the figure below. The share of electricity in total energy consumption in the sector also lags the world average, in terms of both current levels and the rate of increase.

For further details, see: About the data.

The current low rates of electricity use in Indian industry imply that there is major potential for electrification, using technologies and processes already in place in other countries.

New investments in coal 

While the clean-power expansion is starting to meet most or all of India’s electricity demand growth, there are still large investment plans across the coal supply chain.

Some 43GW of coal-power capacity was under construction at the end of June. Additional coal-power capacity is seen as necessary to meet increasing peak loads, even as solar power and energy storage are already playing a role in covering daytime and evening peak demand, respectively. The expansion of energy storage will increase this contribution.

Outside the power sector, India has major ambitions to produce chemical-industry products, such as fertiliser and plastic feedstock, from coal through coal gasification, in pursuit of energy security.

The government is targeting a capacity to process 100m tonnes of coal per year in the next four years, despite the technology for coal gasification still being nascent in India. At present, the only operational use of coal gasification is at Jindal Steel Limited, which is reportedly using syngas in its steel-making process. 

Meanwhile, India plans to reduce its average CO2 emissions per tonne of steel by 25% by 2025-26, mainly by reducing the share of coal-based steelmaking.

At the same time, the government is aiming to increase the use of domestic coking coal, which it notified in January this year as a “critical and strategic mineral”. Coal miners and steel companies are reportedly planning to establish additional washeries for coking coal to make it suitable for blending with imported coal for use in steel production. 

India is also looking to invest in new coal mines in the near future. 

These continued investments in coal gasification, domestic coking coal and new coal mining capacity could lock in coal use across industry for several decades.  

Outlook for India’s emissions

Over the two-year period from the first half of 2024 to the same period in 2026, India has achieved its largest clean-energy expansion on record.

As a result, power-demand growth has been met entirely by clean electricity and CO2 emissions in the sector have flatlined.

This expansion of clean energy also allowed a reduction in fossil-fuel imports for power generation, with the use of imported coal falling 38% and the use of gas by 35%, supporting the energy security aims of the government and reducing exposure to the Hormuz shock.

In order to keep the clean-energy growth going, India would need to overcome multiple obstacles, including expansion of the electricity transmission network, improvements in grid flexibility to accommodate variable renewables and the timely completion of new projects. 

For example, renewable power projects totalling 5.3GW missed completion deadlines and are having to pay penalties to the grid operator in order to retain network access.

Curtailment has emerged as an issue, particularly for projects relying on interstate power transmission, pointing to the need to upgrade the network. (Curtailment refers to electricity generation that is “wasted” because it cannot be accommodated by the power network.)

Another obstacle to be overcome if clean energy is to keep growing will be making coal-power plants more flexible, so they can ramp down during high renewable output.

A flexibility plan for coal-power plants has been delayed by more than a year due to persistent regulatory bottlenecks, contributing to the curtailment of renewable energy. 

Expanding energy storage has the potential to ease grid and flexibility constraints, while reducing or eliminating the need for adding thermal-power capacity to meet peak loads.

The Central Electricity Authority has proposed that, after June 2027, all new government-owned solar and wind projects would have “mandatory” two-hour battery storage. (This mirrors a policy that was in place in China until early 2025 and was subsequently scrapped, in favour of more market-based approaches.)

For oil and gas, India’s consumption has been flatlining for the past two years, after half a century of continuous growth that was only briefly interrupted by Covid-19.

This has reduced the impacts of the Hormuz crisis on the country’s trade balance, helping close the gap between supply and consumption. But it has entailed disruptive shifts in many oil-dependent sectors.

For example, high prices and fuel shortages due to the Hormuz crisis led state governments to reverse their orders banning the use of dirtier fuels such as fuel oil, kerosene and coal in industries and commercial establishments.

Meanwhile, EV adoption has also begun to influence oil consumption. 

Despite the progress in the power sector and reductions in oil consumption, India’s total emissions went up over the past two years due to a major increase in industrial emissions.

Low levels of electricity use in industry mean that growing industrial output results in increasing direct fossil-fuel use and emissions.

Unless the rate of industrial electrification picks up, increases in heavy industry output will continue to translate into increases in fossil-fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.

About the data

This analysis is based on official monthly data for fuel consumption, industrial production and power generation from different ministries and government institutes. 

Coal-power emissions are estimated by combining plant-level coal consumption from the Central Electricity Authority’s (CEA) monthly coal reports with data on the calorific value and emission factors of coal used at different power plants from the CEA’s CO2 baseline database.

For each station and month, total coal consumption is split into domestic and imported coal using the imported share of coal receipts over a trailing two-month window, found to best reproduce the actual split in data available for 2023.

Consumption is converted to CO2 using each plant’s station-specific gross calorific value from the CEA database and IPCC emission factors for domestic coal, imported coal and lignite. The national-average calorific value is used for recently added plants, for which data is not available in the baseline database. 

Coal use at steel and cement plants, as well as process emissions from cement production, are estimated using production indices from the index of eight core industries released monthly by the Office of Economic Adviser, assuming that changes in total fossil-fuel use follow production volumes. These production indices were used to scale fuel use by the sectors in 2022.

To form a basis for using the indices, monthly coal-consumption data for 2022 was constructed for the sectors by combining the annual total coal and petcoke consumption reported in IEA World Energy Balances with monthly production data. This work was set out in a paper by Robbie Andrew, a researcher at Norwegian research institute CICERO, on monthly CO2 emission accounting for India. Monthly petcoke consumption was available from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, while coal consumption by the cement industry was calculated by subtracting petcoke use from total fossil-fuel use.

Annual cement-process emissions up to 2025 were also taken from Andrew’s work and scaled using the production indices. This approach better approximated changes in energy use and emissions reported in the IEA World Energy Balances, than did the amounts of coal reported to have been dispatched to the sectors, showing that production volumes are the dominant driver of short-term changes in emissions.

For other sectors – including aluminium, auto, chemical and petrochemical, paper and plywood, pharmaceutical, graphite electrode, sugar, textile, mining, traders and others – coal consumption is estimated based on data on despatch of domestic and imported coal to end users from statistical reports and monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal, as consumption data is not available.

Coal consumption by “captive” coal-power plants – those supplying power to industrial sites, not to the public electricity network – was calculated based on capacity changes from Global Energy Monitor, assuming constant utilisation, as utilisation has been very stable year-to-year, as calculated from Central Electricity Authority data.

The difference between coal consumption and dispatch is stock changes, which are estimated by assuming that the changes in the amount of coal stored at end-user facilities mirror those at coal mines, with end-user inventories excluding power, steel and cement assumed to be 70% of those at coal mines, based on comparisons between our data and the IEA World Energy Balances.

Stock changes at mines are estimated as the difference between production at and dispatch from coal mines, as reported by the Ministry of Coal.

Coal consumption is estimated in two ways for sectors beyond power, steel and cement. Consumption of domestic coal in these other sectors is taken from the monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal. Their consumption of imported coal is estimated from the total imports of thermal coal reported by consultancy Kpler, by subtracting demand for imports at coal-power plants. The basis for this assumption is that steel and cement industries use little imported thermal coal, according to Ministry of Coal data.

Product-by-product consumption data for petroleum products, as well as gas use by sector, is from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.

As the fuel dispatch and consumption data is reported as physical volumes – such as tonnes or litres – calorific values are taken from IEA’s World Energy Balance and CO2 emission factors from 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.

The emissions factor for motor oil or petrol was updated, based on the blending percentage of ethanol each year. The ethanol-blending percentage is as reported by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. 

Calorific values are assigned separately to different fuel types, including domestic and imported coal, anthracite and coke, as well as to petrol, diesel and several other oil products.

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Global fossil-fuel emissions are set to fall by around 0.5% in 2026 amid the fallout from the Hormuz crisis, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

The US-Iran war has severely disrupted trade through the strait of Hormuz, causing a spike in oil and gas prices that continues to ripple around the global economy.

Each month of disruption – and each new flashpoint, such as in Yemen – is increasing the incentive to switch to alternatives.

Those alternatives include coal, with the latest forecasts pointing to a 1.2% rise in coal demand this year – apparently supporting media claims of a “return to coal” in the wake of the crisis.

Yet Carbon Brief’s analysis shows the rise in emissions associated with this increased coal use, much of which is unrelated to Hormuz, is set to be more than offset by declines for oil and gas.

The estimated overall impact on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels in 2026 is shown in the figure below and amounts to a reduction of around 0.5% from 2025 levels.

(Fossil fuels account for two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions.)

The emissions estimates for each fossil fuel are based on the latest forecasts from the International Energy Agency (IEA) for coal, oil and gas, in light of the ongoing global energy crisis.

For example, the agency initially estimated that global coal demand would decline this year. In its 2025 coal report, published in mid-December, it said that declining coal demand in China would outweigh the impact of pro-coal policies under US president Donald Trump.

In contrast, the latest update, published in September 2026, said that global coal demand would rise by 1.2% in 2026, instead of the small decline that had been expected.

The report highlighted the boost to coal demand from higher gas prices in the wake of Hormuz. However, there are limits to this, because few countries can switch from gas to coal at large scale.

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The IEA’s latest report also noted the role of a strong El Niño, which is pushing up the need for cooling and depressing hydropower output in key markets. Other short-term factors are also affecting coal demand this year, including a rising amount of “wasted” wind and solar in China.

For gas, the IEA did not initially update its previous forecast that global gas demand would rise by 2.0% in 2026, which had been published in January of this year.

Its most recent forecast – published in July – already pointed to a 0.6% drop in demand in 2026. Since then, pressure on gas demand from high prices has only grown stronger.

For oil, there has been an even more dramatic shift in forecasts since the start of the year.

In its January 2026 oil market report, the IEA forecast a rise in demand in 2026 of 930,000 barrels per day (bpd). As shown in the figure below, this has been steadily revised downwards over the course of the year, as the Hormuz crisis was first ignited – and then extended.

By September, the IEA was forecasting a 2,500,000bpd drop in oil demand in 2026, equivalent to a reduction of 2.4% from 2025 levels.

(A 15 September research note from Morgan Stanley, not available online, found a “consensus” forecast of a 2,415,000bpd drop in demand in 2026.)

While there are many short-term factors at play in the shifting forecasts for 2026, it is clear that the latest energy crisis will also affect fossil-fuel demand in the next year and beyond.

For example, whereas the IEA initially forecast that oil demand would rebound in 2027 to well above 2025 levels, it is now expecting use of the fuel to be effectively flat for two years.

This puts a question mark over its previous expectation – published in October last year – that global oil demand would not peak until as late as 2030.

“For every month the conflict lasts, the probability of permanent [oil] demand destruction increases,” wrote Sverre Alvik, vice president at consultancy DNV in a late August analysis.

As fuel prices have surged, electric vehicles (EVs) have captured record shares of major car markets, from Australia and China through to Europe, Indonesia and Thailand.

In July, EV sales nearly doubled year-on-year in “new markets”, noted Alvik, pointing to countries outside China, Europe and North America.

The IEA says the 2027 outlooks for coal and gas are interdependent, with coal demand potentially increasing again if gas prices remain elevated – or dropping back if gas prices ease.

At the same time, governments in countries that had planned to rely on imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) have been signalling shifts towards favouring domestic clean energy instead – or continuing to use coal for longer.

The current crisis, therefore, has the potential to not only lower fossil-fuel use and emissions in the short term, but also on a more lasting basis.

Related Analysis: India’s power-sector emissions flat for two years due to clean-energy surge 17.09.2026 Emissions CCC: Heathrow expansion could push flights to ‘80% of UK emissions by 2050’ 16.09.2026 Emissions Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions fall in Q2 2026 due to plummeting oil use 03.09.2026 Emissions Explainer: The CMIP7 emissions scenarios – and how they explore future climate change 01.09.2026 Climate modelling

The post Analysis: Global fossil-fuel emissions set to fall in 2026 amid Hormuz crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Aviation is on track to be responsible for 80% of the UK’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 2050, according to the Climate Change Committee (CCC).

Emissions from flying have more than doubled since 1990 – driven by rising passenger numbers – even as the climate impact of every other sector in the UK economy has fallen.

The UK does not have “credible” policies in place to reverse this trend of rising emissions, says the CCC in new advice to the government on future aviation policy.

The government has signalled its support for expanding Heathrow, the nation’s largest airport, while relying on “techno-fixes” such as “sustainable aviation fuels” (SAFs) to cut emissions. 

Yet, even without Heathrow expansion, the CCC says aviation emissions are on track to be higher in 2050 than they are today – reaching 38m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2).

As the chart below shows, this would account for most of the remaining CO2 from the UK economy, all of which would need to be removed from the atmosphere in order to meet the legal target of net-zero emissions.

Expanding Heathrow would add another 2.4MtCO2 in 2050, amounting to around 5% of all the UK’s emissions. (This would increase to 4.5MtCO2 when expansion is complete in 2054.)

With a final decision on Heathrow expansion expected by 2029, the government asked the CCC  for its advice on whether the plan is compatible with the UK’s climate targets. 

The CCC has concluded that the UK simply lacks sufficient policies to reduce aviation emissions and “expanding Heathrow would compound the problem”. In a press briefing, CCC chair Nigel Topping told journalists:

“The UK does not currently have a credible plan to reduce [aviation emissions] in line with net-zero, so that creates a serious challenge for meeting our climate commitments.”

The “jet-zero strategy”, launched by the previous Conservative government in 2022, set out plans to cut aviation emissions. However, the Labour government has since accepted that the strategy’s expectations for SAFs, electric planes and fuel-efficiency improvements were unrealistic.

The CCC says a “credible and robust net-zero policy framework for aviation” should be set out in a revised strategy, which is planned for 2027. Only then could Heathrow expansion be aligned with the net-zero goal, adds the committee.

As part of this new strategy, the CCC says the “aviation sector needs to take responsibility for its emissions”. It says policies should be designed based on the “polluter pays” principle, requiring the aviation industry to fund its own SAFs and CO2 removal.

Specifically, the committee says funding will be needed for “engineered removal” technologies, such as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS). 

These technologies are currently “not yet available at the scale required”, but are vital for the kind of permanent CO2 removal needed to mop up aviation emissions, says the CCC.

(“Natural solutions” such as tree planting are the other main way CO2 is expected to be removed from the atmosphere. However, the CCC envisages these removals offsetting the remaining methane emissions from livestock agriculture in the UK, whereas it says “engineered removals” would be required to remove and store CO2 from flights.)

The CCC acknowledges that placing decarbonisation costs on airlines would likely lead to higher ticket prices. It estimates that this could mean an increase, in 2024 prices, of around £150 for a return trip to Alicante, Spain, and £400 for a return trip to New York by 2050. 

However, it says this is preferable to a public spending approach, which would result in the roughly 50% of the population who do not fly paying for flight-related CO2 removals.

In addition, the committee notes that higher costs would help to manage demand for flights, which would otherwise be expected to increase considerably over the coming decades.

related Analysis: Global fossil-fuel emissions set to fall in 2026 amid Hormuz crisis 16.09.2026 Emissions El Niño: Indonesia fire emissions in 2026 ‘on track’ to match record for this century 11.09.2026 El Niño and La Niña UK aviation emissions to be 50% higher than thought by 2050, government admits 10.09.2026 Aviation and shipping Analysis: UK solar power hits record high over summer 2026 04.09.2026 Renewables

The post CCC: Heathrow expansion could push flights to ‘80% of UK emissions by 2050’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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All the ambulance services in England experienced some of their busiest-ever days during this summer’s record-breaking June heatwave, according to data obtained by Carbon Brief.

In June, temperatures climbed past 37C in parts of the country as authorities declared only the second ever “red” extreme heat warning.

Four out of 10 NHS ambulance services, including London’s, responded to unprecedented numbers of life-threatening emergencies on at least one day from 23-27 June.

Another two services – in the south-west and east of the country – received their highest volume of 999 calls on record.

Ambulance services provided data on their busiest days since records began, in response to freedom-of-information (FOI) requests from Carbon Brief.

The results show how demand during the June heatwave exceeded levels seen during the traditionally busy winter season in other years – and even the height of the Covid-19 pandemic – for many services.

Heat demand

Extreme heat ramps up the risk of numerous life-threatening conditions, including heart disease and respiratory problems. 

England experienced record-breaking temperatures at the end of June, with the whole country covered by amber or red “heat health alerts” from the government.

A red alert, which was issued for the entire Midlands and south of England, indicates “significant risk to life for even the healthy population”. This was only the second time such an alert has been triggered.

Researchers calculated that there were nearly 3,000 heat-related deaths in the UK this summer. There has also been unprecedented demand for A&E departments and some ambulance services.

To investigate the strain facing ambulances, Carbon Brief sent FOI requests to the 10 NHS ambulance trusts in England, asking for lists of their busiest days. 

This covered both the total volume of 999 calls and “category 1” responses – referring to incidents involving “life-threatening injuries and illnesses”, such as heart attacks.

The chart below shows the busiest days on record for England’s ambulances, including both total calls and category 1 responses. Most services were able to provide records back to the 2010s. (See: Methodology.)

The five-day period from 23-27 June is overrepresented in these results, with at least two heatwave days ranking in the top 20 for every service in the country.

The top 20 rankings for services across England cover different periods of time. See Methodology for more details.

This trend is especially pronounced in the south and east of England, where June temperatures exceeded 36C and even approached 38C in some regions.

London, South East Coast, South Central and North East ambulance services all reported daily records for responding to life-threatening emergencies during the heatwave.

For the South East Coast and South Central services – which cover a region stretching from Oxfordshire to Kent – 25, 26 and 27 June all saw unprecedented numbers of category 1 callouts. 

South Western and East of England services both saw record numbers of 999 calls on 26 June, the same day the highest-ever June UK temperature was reported in Norfolk.

It is worth noting that demand for ambulance services – including category 1 calls – has been growing for many years, driven by factors such as an ageing population, more complex health conditions and growing mental-health pressures.

This helps to explain why dates from before the 2020s are rare in the top rankings provided to Carbon Brief.

Beyond the heatwave, 2026 as a whole is on track to be a record year for ambulance demand.

‘Stifling heat’

On 26 June, the busiest day of the heatwave, ambulances across England responded to 4,084 life-threatening emergencies.

The average daily volume of such incidents is normally around 2,500 during the summer months.

Stu Holliday, head of emergency preparedness, resilience and response at North East Ambulance Service, tells Carbon Brief: 

“During periods of hot weather, we typically see an increase in calls from people affected by dehydration, heat exhaustion and heatstroke, as well as those whose existing health conditions, particularly heart and respiratory illnesses, can be made worse by prolonged high temperatures.

“Older people, young children and pregnant people can be especially vulnerable.”

Ambulance teams are generally busier in the winter because cold weather and seasonal illnesses drive up the number of severe medical emergencies.

However, the data from June shows that extremely hot days are starting to match or even edge out cold ones as the busiest days. This is a trend seen across the healthcare system.

While not every service provided records back to 2019, the data broadly shows that ambulances were busier during the heatwave than at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.

As well as patients, heatwaves put pressure on ambulance workers. The UNISON union has warned of crews facing “stifling heat with faulty or no air conditioning” and “back-to-back callouts” due to increased demand.

Methodology

Carbon Brief requested data on the top 50 busiest days for England’s 10 main ambulance services.

These are: London; South East Coast; South Central; South Western; West Midlands; East Midlands; East of England; North East; Yorkshire; and North West.

Data was requested for as far back as service records go. Most were able to provide records going back to some point in the 2010s, with the exception of North East and South Central, which only had records from 2021 and 2022 onwards, respectively. 

Rising annual demand for ambulance services means that most of the busiest days for ambulances have been in the 2020s. For example, all but four of the busiest days for category 1 emergencies reported to Carbon Brief were in the 2020s. 

Carbon Brief requested data on ambulance demand for all the UK nations. In Scotland and Northern Ireland – where temperatures are cooler – services did not see call volumes reach the top 50 rankings during the June heatwave. The Welsh Ambulance Service did not respond to Carbon Brief’s request.

related Revealed: More than 1,000 NHS operations cancelled due to record UK heatwaves 11.09.2026 Health and society Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa 29.07.2026 Health and society Q&A: How heat-related deaths are counted by scientists and public health authorities 17.07.2026 Extreme weather Guest post: France’s June heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths 07.07.2026 Health and society

The post Revealed: England’s June 2026 heatwave sparked record demand for ambulances appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Wildfires currently burning large swathes of land in Indonesia are on track to produce emissions on a par with the country’s most-intense fire season this century, according to experts. 

Data from the Global Fire Emissions Database reveals that, as of 7 September, fires in Indonesia produced 76m tonnes of carbon (MtC) in 2026.

This puts 2026 on the same trajectory as 2015, when fires burned 2.6m hectares of land across the country and generated a total of 333MtC. 

Dr Guido van der Werf, a researcher at Wageningen University in the Netherlands, tells Carbon Brief that the fires in Indonesia are “more or less on track” to reach levels seen 11 years ago.

Parts of the country – including the eastern province of Papua – are “burning more than they’ve ever burned”, he says.

Indonesia is no stranger to emissions-intensive fires. Research has estimated that the record 1997 fire season generated carbon emissions equivalent to 13-40% of all global fossil-fuel emissions that year. 

Meanwhile, a separate study that looked at carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the 2015 fires in south-east Asia – which primarily burned Indonesia – found they were greater than the total of the EU’s fossil-fuel emissions that year. The “severe haze” from the fires has been linked to more than 100,000 premature deaths across the region.

El Niño influence

As in 2015 and in 1997, this year’s Indonesian fires come during an El Niño year.

The naturally-occurring climate phenomenon, linked to ocean temperatures in the Pacific, periodically drives up temperatures and dries out land in Indonesia – creating the conditions for fires so immense that they imprint on global emissions. 

Scientists are projecting that this year’s El Niño – which started in June and is expected to last into 2027 – will be one of the most intense on record.

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Dr Mark Parrington, a senior scientist from the Copernicus Climate Change Service explains: 

“From August until the end of October [to] November is the dry season in Indonesia. We do normally see fire around this time of year, but nowhere near the scale that we’ve seen this year, or indeed any of the previous El Niño years”.

Dr Nisa Novita, strategic lead for peatland at Indonesian environmental NGO Yayasan Konservasi Alam Nusantara, tells Carbon Brief that El Niño “does not directly cause most fires”, but acts as a “major amplifier by creating hotter and drier conditions, making fires easier to ignite, spread faster and much harder to control”. 

Studies have shown that fires in Indonesia often occur where there has been significant land clearance and peatland drainage for agriculture and palm oil plantations. These practices create a dry landscape that is highly flammable during times of drought.

Pink bars show years in which an El Niño event was called by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. GFED fire emissions data for 1980-96 is from Field et al. (2009) and Van Marle et al. (2017); data for 1997-2022 is from Van der Werf et al. (2025); and data for 2022 onwards is from Chen et al. (2026).

Van der Werf says the scale of this year’s fires – and whether they will end up being more intense than 2015 – will depend on the length of this year’s El Niño event, as well as the effectiveness of recent peatland conservation efforts.

Novita explains that Indonesia’s fires are heavily emissions-intensive due to its large tropical peatland ecosystem: 

“When peatlands are degraded and drained due to canal development for agriculture, the water table drops, making the peat dry and highly flammable especially during dry seasons or El Niño events, like now.

“Unlike fires in dry ecosystems, peat fires can smolder underground, so the soil itself becomes readily available fuel.”

Extensive peatland restoration efforts in Indonesia in recent years have been credited with reducing the number of fires during the 2019 El Niño.

After the catastrophic fires in 1997-98, the Indonesian government introduced a range of measures designed to strengthen peatland protection and restoration through dedicated institutions and regulations. This included the introduction of a moratorium on licenses to convert forests and peatlands into plantations and logging areas. 

In the aftermath of the 2015 fires, it established an official peatland restoration agency, which was given an additional mandate for mangrove restoration in 2021. This agency was dissolved last year. Novita says:

“We have learned and improved…But the question is: is it enough? Or are we still underestimating the risk that degraded peatlands pose, especially when we face another El Niño?”

Van der Werf says it remains unclear from the 2026 fire data how great an impact recent efforts to restore peatland in Indonesia have had on reducing the impact and spread of the fires: 

“I had hoped that this year Indonesia would be relatively quiet, even though we have a big El Niño…You could argue if those regulations worked, then this wouldn’t be a big fire [season], even though it [has been] very dry. 

“This is maybe the case in Sumatra [which has seen a quiet fire season], but definitely not in other regions. Papua [a region of Indonesia] and [neighbouring country of] Papua New Guinea – those are the new frontiers. They are basically going through the same thing that Sumatra went through 20 years ago.”

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The post El Niño: Indonesia fire emissions in 2026 ‘on track’ to match record for this century appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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• Climate science
• Net-zero target
• Energy costs
• Oil and gas
• Impacts and adaptation
• Clean energy

Reform UK, led by Nigel Farage, has emerged as a major force in UK politics in recent years – pushing anti-net-zero policies, alongside vehement opposition to immigration.

The hard-right populist party is currently mired in a funding controversy and only has a handful of MPs, yet, until recently, it had been leading in national polls for more than a year.

As seen with many similar parties across Europe and beyond, a rejection of climate science is central to Reform’s ideological outlook.

Richard Tice, the party’s deputy leader, is a vocal critic of what he calls “net stupid zero” and has incorrectly blamed “the sun or volcanoes” for human-caused global warming.

As Reform’s energy spokesperson, Tice has also been clear that, if the party were ever to form a national government, it would scrap the UK’s net-zero target, support fossil-fuel expansion and tear up existing contracts for renewable energy.

While less vocal on the subject, Farage has, nevertheless, expressed climate-sceptic views and falsely blamed net-zero policies for the “deindustrialisation of Britain”.

These views draw on long-standing, inaccurate climate-sceptic narratives and are reflected in Reform’s election manifestos, its actions in local government and the opinions of many of its supporters.

Here, Carbon Brief gathers together by topic and factchecks 45 false or misleading claims made by the party’s leadership relating to climate change, renewables and net-zero.

• Climate science
• Net-zero target
• Energy costs
• Oil and gas
• Impacts and adaptation
• Clean energy

Climate science

FALSE

Tice: “There’s no evidence that man-made CO2 is going to change climate change…The Norwegian government’s own equivalent of our ONS [Office of National Statistics] has recently produced a report along the lines of what I’m saying.”

Sky News, February 2025

The world’s authority on climate science, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), says it is “unequivocal” that humans have warmed the planet, primarily through releasing greenhouse gases.

The IPCC says that, due to human activities, concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) “have increased at rates that have no precedent on centennial timescales in at least the past 800,000 years”.

It adds that concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere are now higher than they have been for at least the past two million years.

The report that Tice is referring to is by two independent authors, with Statistics Norway clarifying in 2024 that their views are “not the official stance” of the statistics bureau. (It has also not been formally peer reviewed.)

A factcheck of the Norwegian report by a climate scientist for RealClimate describes it as “misguided” and a “distraction due to errors”.

Another factcheck published by the Norwegian University of Science and Technology found it “contains standard talking-points of climate denial”.

MISLEADING

Tice: “Look, the climate’s always changed for millions of years. And it goes through cycles, long, medium and short.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Global temperatures are currently around 1.4C hotter than when the industrial era first began in 1850-1900, as shown in the figure below.

The IPCC says that this amount of warming is likely to have made Earth hotter than at any time in about 125,000 years.

Data from NASA GISTEMP, NOAA GlobalTemp, Hadley/UEA HadCRUT5, Berkeley Earth, Copernicus ERA5, JRA-3Q, DCENT, and China-MST. Temperature records are aligned over the 1981-2010 period and use the WMO approach to calculate warming relative to pre-industrial levels (1850-1900).

Scientists overwhelmingly agree that approximately 100% of this warming has been caused by humans. 

There are also natural influences that can affect Earth’s climate on shorter timescales, such as El Niño events, volcanic eruptions and small variations in the output of the sun. However, scientists have found that these have only a limited effect on the underlying trend of long-term global warming.

When looking at longer timescales of millions of years or more, Earth has experienced multiple ice ages interspersed with warmer periods.

These changes in climate were triggered by variations in Earth’s orbit around the sun, in combination with subtle fluctuations in the tilt and rotation of the planet, over tens of thousands of years. However, the resulting changes to CO2 levels in the atmosphere also played a role.

This should serve as a “cautionary example”, according to Dr Zeke Hausfather, a climate scientist and Carbon Brief contributor, “because human emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases push the Earth further out of the range of climate conditions that have characterised the past few million years”.

FALSE

Tice: “The idea that you can stop the power of the sun or volcanoes is simply ludicrous.”

BBC Breakfast, June 2024

Scientists overwhelmingly agree that humans have caused 100% of recent climate change.

Tice’s suggestion that the sun or volcanic eruptions are behind current warming is false.

As the video below explains, the sun and volcanic eruptions have little bearing on the long-term trend of global temperature rise since the Industrial Revolution.

MISLEADING

Farage: “All I do know is that man produces about 3% of the CO2 produced in the world every year and that it is nuts to call CO2 a poison.”

BBC Radio 5 Live, June 2024

The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere is now higher than it has been for at least two million years, having spiked dramatically since the Industrial Revolution.

This surge in CO2 levels is entirely due to human activity, particularly the burning of fossil fuels. While Farage is correct that, on an annual basis, humans only account for a few percent of all the CO2 that is released into the atmosphere, this is irrelevant.

The world’s land and ocean naturally release hundreds of billions of tonnes of CO2 each year. However, the land and ocean also absorb hundreds of billions of tonnes of CO2 each year, meaning that – before the start of the fossil-fuel era – these flows were broadly in balance.

The recycling of CO2 through Earth’s natural systems is known as the “global carbon cycle”.

Since the start of the Industrial Revolution, humans have disrupted Earth’s natural balance by releasing vast amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere.

The IPCC says that, because of humans, concentrations of CO2 “have increased at rates that have no precedent…in at least the past 800,000 years”.

It adds that concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere are now higher than they have been for at least the past two million years.

FALSE

Tice: “Many thousands of scientists fundamentally disagree about the need to [reach net-zero], or the pace to [achieve net-zero]…But they have been smeared and labelled. They can’t get any research grant funding.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Contrary to Tice’s claim, there are not “thousands” of scientists that disagree on the need for net-zero.

Tice is likely referring to a “world climate declaration” that was circulated on social media by climate sceptics in 2022, supposedly signed by “1,200 climate experts”. A closer look at the list of signatories revealed that less than 1% described themselves as climate scientists – and six of the people on the list were dead.

Reaching net-zero emissions globally is the “only way” to stop climate change, according to the IPCC. The IPCC’s most recent set of reports involved 721 scientists in 90 countries.

All modelled pathways for limiting global warming to 1.5C by 2100, the ambition of the Paris Agreement, involve reaching net-zero emissions around the middle of the century.

This is reflected in the text of the Paris Agreement, which aims to “achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century”.

FALSE 

Tice: “The proof of my argument is one of the IPCC reports a few years ago that said even if you get to net-zero effectively tomorrow, it’ll make no difference to one of the key things people are most worried about, which is sea level rise, for somewhere between 200 years on the one hand and 1,000 years on the other hand.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Although it is true that sea level rise is set to worsen, even if countries reach net-zero, it is certainly not the case that making efforts to cut emissions will make “no difference”.

Tice is likely referring to the IPCC’s special report on 1.5C released in 2018.

It said with “high confidence” that human-caused global warming to date will “persist for centuries to millennia and will continue to cause further long-term changes in the climate system, such as sea level rise”.

A more recent study, published in Nature Climate Change in 2025, found that following current climate policies would cause an extra 79cm of sea level rise by the year 2300.

However, reducing emissions in line with 1.5C would cut this additional sea level rise to 15cm. 

Moreover, the best-available evidence shows that warming will more or less stop when the world reaches net-zero emissions. Even if some sea level rise continues, net-zero would still prevent a long list of other increasingly severe climate impacts from taking place.

FALSE

Tice: “The IPCC has just resiled from one of its core assumptions, which was the [RCP]8.5 scenario…One of the foundations of the IPCC’s very ethos in the last 20-30 years, they’ve just abandoned.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The “foundations” of the evidence on climate change, as well as the risk of “catastrophic” warming without stronger action, are unchanged by the recent shift on “RCP8.5”.

“RCP8.5” is one of a range of emissions scenarios that climate scientists have used  when making projections about future climate change. It is a scenario of very high global emissions, imagining a future with large increases in coal use and no climate policies.

In May 2026, a new set of emissions scenarios were published, no longer including a scenario with emissions as high as those in RCP8.5 (or its successor, SSP5-8.5). 

This moment was seized upon by a range of climate-sceptic and rightwing figures – including US president Donald Trump – who falsely claimed it as evidence that the IPCC had to “admit” that it was “wrong” about future climate change.

This is incorrect because it both misrepresents the meaning of the shift on RCP8.5 and because the set of emissions scenarios in question were not developed by the IPCC in the first place. Instead, they were put together by a group of climate modelling experts. (See Carbon Brief’s factcheck for more information.)

While the new scenarios no longer include such high emissions as in RCP8.5 – partly as a result of limited climate policy success – they also show it is now “not possible” to limit global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels without significant “overshoot”.

Moreover, projections suggest that the world is still on course for between 2.5C and 3C of warming. This level of warming was previously described as “catastrophic” by the UN.

MISLEADING

Tice: “Cleaner air equals higher temperatures, not CO2.”

Twitter/X, July 2026

According to the IPCC, 100% of warming since the Industrial Revolution is due to human-caused greenhouse gas emissions, particularly CO2.

Tice cites a Daily Telegraph article with the incorrect headline: “Heatwaves caused by fall in pollution.” He erroneously claims this as evidence that “we have been gaslit and lied to” about the causes of climate change.

In fact, as a Carbon Brief factcheck of that article notes, scientists say that the framing of heatwaves being “caused” by declining air pollution is simply “wrong”.

The claim is based on a paper in Geophysical Research Letters, which looks at how air pollution affects circulation patterns in the atmosphere and influences summer temperatures in Europe. 

Scientists have long known that human-caused emissions of aerosols “mask” global warming, partly because they reflect or absorb sunlight. Curbing air pollution, therefore, removes some of this cooling effect.

Nevertheless, the lead author of the study in question is clear that greenhouse gas emissions remain the “most important factor” driving Europe’s extreme heat events, due to their role in global warming. 

A recent attribution study by the World Weather Attribution service concluded that the June heatwave in Europe would have been “virtually impossible” without climate change.

Net-zero target

FALSE

Tice: “Net-zero will make zero difference to climate change.”

BBC Breakfast, June 2024

In fact, reaching net-zero emissions globally is the “only way” to stop climate change, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 

At that point, when carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions have been cut substantially and any remaining emissions are balanced out by CO2-removal technology or tree-planting, then warming is expected to essentially stop.

FALSE

Tice: “It’s incredibly stupid for the UK to almost unilaterally say, we’re going to lead the way in the world.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

It is completely false to argue that the UK is acting “unilaterally” to tackle climate change.

The UK has indeed been a leader in climate legislation. When the then-Conservative government set the UK a legally binding “net-zero by 2050” target in 2019, it was the first major economy to do so. 

However, 140 of the world’s 198 countries now have net-zero targets, covering 74% of the world’s emissions. Some have set more ambitious goals, such as Germany’s target of reaching net-zero by 2045, while others are even aiming for “net-negative” emissions.

The UK is, therefore, not pursuing net-zero “unilaterally”. Indeed, if the UK abandoned its net-zero target, it would join the US and Iran as the only major emitters without one.

MISLEADING

Tice: “We’re responsible for 0.7, 0.8% of CO2 emissions.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The UK’s annual emissions, including emissions from fossil fuels and land-use changes, were roughly 0.7% of the global total in 2024, the most recent year for which data is available. When only considering fossil-fuel combustion, the figure is 0.8%.

Yet, while the numbers Tice quotes are accurate, it is misleading to use them as a justification for abandoning climate policies.

Only six nations each produce more than 2% of the world’s annual emissions. In 1990, the UK was one of those rare countries, but it has roughly halved its share since then, largely due to renewable-energy expansion. Even today, it remains the world’s 22nd largest emitter.

As the chart below shows, more than a third of all greenhouse gases come from the roughly 180 nations that produce 1% or less of the world’s emissions. If none of them acted, the world would never stop climate change.

Finally, some analysts point out the UK’s “moral responsibility” to act on climate change, given its large historical contribution to current levels of global warming. 

The UK, through its historical CO2 emissions, is responsible for around 3% of current warming. When emissions in other countries under the UK’s colonial rule are counted as well, its share grows to more than 5% of the global total.

FALSE

Tice: “[Net-zero is] killing our economy.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Efforts to cut the UK’s emissions are not “killing the economy”. In fact, there is plenty of evidence that they are boosting the economy.

UK emissions in 2025 were 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for the nation’s climate goals. The UK economy has nearly doubled in size over the same period, as the chart below shows. 

GDP has also continued to grow since the net-zero target was introduced in 2019.

A 2026 report from the CBI Economics – the consultancy arm of the Confederation for British Industry (CBI) – concluded:

“Net-zero is already one of the UK’s most productive and geographically distributed industrial sectors, generating high-value employment, driving supply chain activity, and anchoring the UK within one of the defining economic transformations of our era.”

The report concludes that the net-zero economy generated around £105bn in gross value added in 2025. It also supported 1.1m jobs across the country, with considerably higher wages than the UK average.

FALSE

Tice: “The cost of net-zero, which the Climate Change Committee admits is in the trillions of pounds, we don’t know how many trillions, who’s paying that? The British people.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The Climate Change Committee (CCC) estimates that it would cost the UK a total of £108bn to reach net-zero by 2050, equivalent to 0.2% of GDP, while the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) says this would be far cheaper than failing to act.

The idea that net-zero will cost the UK trillions of pounds is false. Such claims invariably rely on analysis that exaggerates the capital cost of net-zero, while excluding both the benefits of cutting emissions and the costs of a system without net-zero policies.

One prominent recent example, promoted by Reform UK, relied on the assumption that gas boilers and petrol cars, for example, would cost nothing to buy and would have free fuel.

The idea that the CCC has “admitted” that net-zero will cost “trillions” may stem from a misinterpretation of CCC analysis from 2019, which estimated a net cost of £321bn.

Alternatively, Tice may be conflating this with another misinterpretation in the 2024 Reform UK manifesto, which falsely claimed that the cost of net-zero would be “£2tn or more”, according to the National Energy System Operator (Neso).

In fact, Neso had estimated that the cost of a net-zero energy system would be “broadly the same” as a high-carbon alternative.

Since then, the CCC has calculated that the net cost of investments needed to reach economy-wide net-zero will be around £108bn out to 2050, or less than 0.2% of GDP. Not only are the up-front investment costs lower than originally thought, but, by the 2040s, there will likely be large operational savings, due to clean technologies being cheaper to run.

There are also benefits from reaching net-zero, such as avoiding climate damages from cutting emissions and shielding the UK from fossil fuel-driven energy price spikes. 

The government, therefore, expects net-zero to deliver substantial economic value to the UK, when weighing both the costs and benefits of meeting the target. The government says meeting its climate target for 2040 would yield net benefits worth £865bn.

Similarly, other bodies, such as Neso and the OBR, find that net-zero is the “cheapest” option for the UK, when compared with failing to cut emissions.

Finally, contrary to Tice’s comments, the vast majority of the capital costs of reaching net-zero will not be borne by public funding from the “British people”. The CCC estimates that 65-90% of the capital required will come from the private sector.

FALSE

Tice: “Labour’s reckless net-zero fantasies are destroying hundreds of thousands of industrial jobs.”

Press Association, July 2025

The transition to a net-zero economy is expected to boost the UK economy and create hundreds of thousands of new jobs.

In a “landmark moment”, as of 2024, there were more people employed in the UK clean-energy sector than the oil and gas industry for the first time, according to the Renewable Energy Association.

While jobs in some sectors are expected to decline in the coming years, there is currently no evidence that “hundreds of thousands” of jobs have been “destroyed” by the net-zero target.

The CCC says that there is a lack of “robust data” on whether UK climate policies have already driven job losses, but notes that “this is unlikely to be the case, as most decarbonisation has occurred in sectors where employment declined for other reasons”.

This can be seen in the employment figures for coal mining, steelmaking and oil and gas production, three industries that were mainstays of the UK economy.

As the chart below shows, all of these sectors employ fewer people today than they did in the past. But their major declines happened long before the net-zero target was set, resulting from a wide range of factors including coal being replaced by cheaper fuels, cyclical downturns in oil prices and competition with steel production overseas.

The grey shaded area indicates the period in which the UK has a net-zero target in place. Definitions from ONS Nomis have changed over the years, but the broad categories covered in this chart are “mining of coal and lignite”, “manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys”, “manufacture of other products of first processing of steel”, “extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas” and “support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction”.

(The chart above only includes jobs in oil and gas extraction, but figures for UK fossil-fuel jobs vary considerably between sources, depending on the sectors classed as relevant. Industry body Offshore Energies UK cites a much broader figure of 180,000 jobs in 2024, which includes “supply chains and regional economies”.)

This does not mean that there will be no impact on the UK workforce in the future. 

A literature review by the CCC concluded that the “phase-down of high-emitting sectors and redirection of sectors” could threaten 8,000-75,000 jobs. This could include roughly 15,000 oil-and-gas workers and around 1,000 people working in coal mines.

One of the sectors that could see big changes is livestock farming, as UK diets shift away from emissions-intensive animal products. Notably, this shift is already taking place without any intervention from the government, let alone net-zero policies.

The CCC also expects there to be “extensive job creation” as the country transitions to a net-zero economy. Job gains in low-carbon sectors, such as renewable energy and clean heating, are set to far surpass losses in other sectors, as the chart below shows.

Overall, the committee says 135,000 to 725,000 “net” new jobs are set to be “created by net-zero”. 

Rather than opposing net-zero targets, some trade unions have stressed the need to support a “just transition” for workers in fossil fuel-intensive sectors. 

Industry groups have also pointed to the significant employment opportunities that a “net-zero economy” will bring. 

FALSE

Farage: “We view the net-zero targets as being the prime reason for the deindustrialisation of Britain.”

Reform UK press conference, February 2025

Net-zero is at the heart of the UK’s industrial strategy and it has frequently been described as the “economic opportunity of the century”. 

CBI chief economist Louise Hellem has described the net-zero economy as “a major part of the national industrial base”, while the Aldersgate Group says net-zero has the potential to be “the UK’s growth engine”.

Moreover, net-zero targets – set in 2019 – are clearly not the “prime reason” for the UK’s “deindustrialisation”, which has been underway for decades.

Since around the 1960s, major industries such as steel and mining have declined in the UK. There are various reasons for this, including globalisation, but the timeline does not match up with the creation of climate legislation.

Around 30% of the nation’s workers were employed in manufacturing after the second world war. By 2000-2016, the period in which the UK introduced its first major climate policies, this had already dropped to 10%, according to the ONS.

In recent years, businesses have warned that the UK’s relatively high industrial electricity prices are driving further “deindustrialisation”. This has been a talking point for those seeking to blame the nation’s net-zero strategy for driving high prices.

However, these arguments tend to omit the UK’s high exposure to expensive gas, which sets the nation’s wholesale electricity prices most of the time. 

The UK steel industry itself says that this exposure to gas is the key reason why it faces much higher electricity prices than counterparts in countries such as France and Germany. 

Energy costs

FALSE

Farage: “If we had carbon-free electricity it would cost over a trillion – and maybe nearer two – to upgrade the entirety of our grid.”

Press conference, August 2025

Cutting the UK’s emissions by using clean power to run an electrified economy is expected to significantly reduce consumer bills.

This is because electrified technologies, such as EVs and heat pumps, are significantly more efficient than fossil-fuel alternatives.

Moreover, the UK would be consolidating three separate energy systems – electricity, gas and transport fuel – into a unified, more efficient and electrified whole.

It would cost £108bn to reach the UK’s net-zero target – including a “carbon-free” electricity grid – according to the Climate Change Committee (CCC).

This includes the investment needed to build a low-carbon energy system, instead of maintaining one built on fossil fuels.

Crucially, it also takes into account the running costs of the two systems, such as the much higher cost of fuel needed for petrol cars, as shown below.

Investing in a net-zero economy would bring benefits worth around £865bn, according to the government. Unlike the CCC figures, this includes avoided climate damages.

It is not clear where Farage’s false claim comes from.

The 2024 Reform UK manifesto included a similar false claim that the “cost of net-zero has been estimated by the National Grid and others at some £2tn or more”.

In reality, the then-National Grid Electricity System Operator – now Neso – had said in 2020 that the cost of building and operating the UK energy system would be “broadly the same”, with or without net-zero.

It is true that the UK will need to invest heavily in upgrading its electricity grid. This will cost some £64bn out to 2030 and another £89bn in the following decade, according to Neso.

This is around 10 times lower than Farage’s claim. But, crucially, it does not include the savings this investment will unlock, such as cheaper travel with electric vehicles.

FALSE

Tice: “There was a direct link between the growth in renewable generating capacity and the growth in electricity prices in the UK.”

Bloomberg interview, May 2026

It is expensive gas that has largely driven up electricity prices in the UK.

High gas prices caused two-thirds of the rise in electricity bills over recent years, according to the UK Energy Research Centre – and this was before the Iran crisis.

The UK has high electricity prices principally because its electricity system remains heavily reliant on gas-fired power plants. This means gas usually sets the price of UK power.

Moreover, the growth in renewable capacity has helped to protect UK billpayers during the latest fossil-fuel price shock, after the US and Israel attacked Iran.

This is an “early sign” that the government’s clean-power plan “may be working”, according to thinktank NESTA. It says “electricity [prices are] beginning to decouple from gas“.

Electricity systems that have high shares of renewable energy tend to have lower wholesale power prices, according to evidence from US states and from European countries.

As the University of Oxford’s Prof Jan Rosenow explains in a recent post on his Bright Spots substack, the “‘renewables make electricity expensive’ claim doesn’t survive contact with the wholesale data”. He adds:

“The countries with the most expensive wholesale electricity are the ones still dependent on gas to set their prices.”

Rosenow notes that the relationship between renewables and consumer bills is less clear, because these also include network charges, policy costs and taxes. He argues for reforms to ensure that “lower wholesale prices [from clean power] feed through into lower bills”.

The CCC also argues for reforms to make electricity cheaper. Still, it concludes that clean power coupled to faster electrification is the clearest route to lower energy bills for the UK.

FALSE

Farage: “Perhaps the real unfairness of net-zero policies…has been the impact on domestic bills, something about which there has been an absolute wall of silence.”

Press conference, February 2025

By far the biggest driver of increases in domestic energy bills in recent years has been the rising cost of gas, not “net-zero policies”.

Gas prices have been trending upwards since the mid-2000s, long before the UK even had a net-zero target. Initially, this was due to dwindling supplies in Europe – including the North Sea – as well as more global competition for gas.

Gas prices then surged in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine and cut off supplies to Europe. This year, war in the Middle East has once again sent gas prices soaring.

Most of the energy bill increases in recent years have been the result of wholesale gas costs rising due to these successive global crises.

There are some parts of domestic energy bills that could be described as “net-zero policies” – notably, the subsidies or “green levies” to support both old and new renewable energy. 

However, these are not the drivers of recent price rises and are a much smaller component of a domestic energy bill than wholesale gas costs. (In addition, a chunk of policy costs have recently been moved off bills into general taxation.)

Moreover, the renewables they support have helped to curb the UK’s reliance on imported gas, saving the nation money.

Finally, the idea that this issue has faced a “wall of silence” is simply not true.

Energy bills and net-zero have been endlessly debated by politicians, commentators and the media. A pledge to cut energy bills was one of the central pillars of the Labour government’s election manifesto in 2024.

FALSE

Tice: “The cost of renewables plus backup, literally by definition, must cost more than backup because there is a cost of capital and a cost of retention of all of the backup…Don’t build it in the first place. We don’t need batteries.”

Bloomberg interview, May 2026

The UK is building a clean-energy system that will cost more to build – and much less to operate – than the current fossil-fuel economy.

Tice is ignoring half of this equation and – by definition – this means he is not giving a full picture.

For example, wind and solar do not need fuel to operate, whereas “backup” plants cannot generate power without gas or fuel oil.

It is highly misleading to look only at the capital investments needed to build wind, solar or gas plants, while ignoring the cost of operating them.

Electricity generation from wind and solar helped the UK avoid gas imports worth £1.7bn in the first two months of the Hormuz crisis alone, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

The CCC says that households could cut their bills by an average of £1,200 per year – even after higher upfront costs – by adopting solar, heat pumps and electric vehicles, as shown below.

.cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } } Household energy costs for heat, power and transport, £ per year. The upfront costs of purchasing cars, heating systems, chargers and solar panels are annualised. Source: CCC progress report 2026.

Ultimately, an electrified economy built on renewables and other sources of clean power will reduce energy waste and cut bills, according to the CCC and others.

FALSE

Tice: “It is as cost-effective or indeed cheaper to put the cables underground.”

Press conference, February 2025

Contrary to repeated claims by Tice, there is clear evidence that it is significantly cheaper to build overhead electricity pylons than it is to “put cables underground”.

It is 3.5-5 times more expensive to bury cables than to run overhead wires, according to research published in May 2026 and shown in the figure below, with other similar studies.

The latest study, by consultancy Ramboll, shows that underground cables remain far more expensive, even where techniques such as “cable ploughing” are used to bury them.

The findings are in line with previous research published by the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in April 2025.

This found that “underground cables are, on average, 4.5 times more expensive than overhead lines”. It said that undersea cables “can be up to 11 times more costly”.

Another consultancy, DNV, reached very similar conclusions in 2024. The IET said the same back in 2012, when it estimated underground cables to be five times more costly.

All of these reports directly contradict claims made by Tice in a 2025 press conference:

“We are serving notice on National Grid…put the cables underground…It is as cost-effective, or indeed cheaper, to put the cables underground.”

Tice’s claim is based on a highly misleading interpretation of the East Anglia network study, published by Neso in 2024.

This study put a price on various options to reinforce the electricity network in the east of England, including a planned overhead route from Norwich to Tilbury.

Contrary to Tice’s claims, figures from project developer National Grid suggest that using underground cables for this route would be 6.5 times more expensive than overhead wires.

If all of the country’s planned new electricity cables were put underground, it could cost up to an extra £22bn, according to Sam Dumitriu, head of policy at thinktank Britain Remade.

FALSE

Tice: “[A ‘windfall tax’ on renewables] is the best way that we can help get the bills down and lower the cost of living.”

Press conference, February 2025

Expensive gas has been the main driver of UK energy bill increases in recent years, particularly as successive global crises have sent global gas prices spiralling.

As such, reducing the UK’s exposure to international gas prices – as well as cutting its reliance on imported fuels for cars and boilers – is key to reducing bills.

Yet, Tice has claimed that the “best way” to cut bills would be through a so-called “windfall tax” on wind and solar power generators.

It is unclear how it would be possible to cut bills – by even a small amount – through an additional tax on renewables, which generate around half of the nation’s electricity.

With “windfall”, Tice borrowed a term that is often used for new taxes on the fossil-fuel companies making billions in additional profits due to war in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Renewables have helped to shield the UK from the impact of these conflicts, by curbing its reliance on gas and saving billions that would otherwise have been spent on costly imports.

Tice suggested that a new tax on renewable energy firms could help “recover” the money previously paid to them in subsidies. However, he has not offered any detail on how the proposed tax would work, how much money it would raise or what impact it might have.

A retrospective change to the tax treatment of existing energy infrastructure would hamper future investment in the system, whether that is for clean power or Tice’s own preferred energy sources.

Blocking renewables through a windfall tax and other changes could stop investments worth tens of billions of pounds, according to the New Economics Foundation thinktank.

MISLEADING
Farage: “Our electricity prices for industry are between five and six times higher than those in America.”

Press conference, February 2025

The UK primarily has high industrial electricity prices due to its exposure to high gas prices.

In turn, the UK and other European countries face much higher gas prices than the US.

This is particularly true since Russia cut off pipeline gas supplies to the continent amid its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – a shift that has been reinforced by EU sanctions.

This means Europe is reliant on internationally traded liquified natural gas (LNG), for which it competes with Japan and other countries.

In contrast, gas prices are low in the US because supplies are often a by-product of more valuable oil extraction, which comes out of the ground with “associated” gas. The demand for US gas is also limited by the amount that can be exported overseas as LNG.

As such, while it is true that UK industrial electricity prices are high compared to other countries, the reasons are different to what Farage implies.

In addition, his claim that costs are “five to six times higher” than the US is overstated. 

The most widely cited figures, based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data, suggest industrial prices are four times higher in the UK than those in the US.

Despite claims made by right-leaning commentators, it would not be possible for the UK to recreate the US gas market dynamics by fracking for shale gas, or by ramping up North Sea gas extraction.

Oil and gas

MISLEADING

Tice: “Let me remind you, in the 80s and 90s…we were growing at between 2.5% and 4% a year. We had deep, plentiful energy driven by oil and gas from the North Sea, right? No one was worried about the price of electricity. No one was worried about the quantity of supply. No one was worried about the reliability of supply.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The UK extracted a significant proportion of its oil and gas resources from the 1980s onwards, after privatising the industry and using the revenue to cut income taxes.

Now, as anticipated at the time, there is very little fuel left to drill.

The UK went through a “dash for gas” in the 1990s, with North Sea gas production levels steadily increasing from the 1980s until the 2000s. 

However, gas production in the North Sea fell by 74% between 2000 and 2025, while oil output fell by 75%.

This is not because policies favouring new oil and gas production ended, but rather because of competition from cheaper sources of the fuels and because the amount of fossil fuels left in the North Sea basin started to run out.

According to the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) thinktank, around 90% of the oil and gas that is likely to be produced from the North Sea has already been burned.

It is also true that electricity prices were much lower in the 1990s than they are today. This is largely explained by rising gas prices – and increasing exposure to imports. 

The UK dash for gas power was driven by cheap gas prices, which favoured a shift away from coal and nuclear. This included cancelling a planned fleet of new nuclear reactors.

When gas subsequently became expensive, electricity prices went up, because the UK was heavily exposed to the fuel. This dynamic continues today, although the rise of renewables is starting to break the link between gas and power prices..

FALSE

Tice: “We [would] allow licences to drill…If you increase the supply of anything, it’s basic economics, the price of that good will come down, as it does in America, where their gas price, their wholesale gas price, is give or take 30% of ours.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Gas is cheap in the US because it is widely extracted as a byproduct of more valuable oil and because demand is limited by export capacity.

These dynamics – and the abundant, easily accessible shale resources in the US – are a function of geography and cannot be replicated in the UK.

North Sea production is in long-term decline and this cannot be reversed by new licenses, because most of the oil and gas that was under the ground has already been burned.

In addition, the production of oil and gas in the North Sea has very limited effects on global energy prices, which determine the cost of UK energy bills.

This is because the country is a relatively small producer, accounting for around 1% of global output. By contrast, the US is the world’s largest oil-and-gas producer.

FALSE

Tice: “If we’d had this common sense not to abandon our North Sea, we wouldn’t have been in that pickle [referring to importing LNG from the US].”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The UK is increasingly reliant on imported fossil fuels, because it has already used up most of the oil and gas that was once under the North Sea.

The country was a net energy exporter in 2000, but, by 2010, was dependent on imports for 30% of its energy supplies. On the same metric, the UK’s net import dependency reached 44% in 2024.

This is not because policies favouring new oil and gas production ended, but rather because the amount of fossil fuels left in the North Sea basin started to run out.

Gas production in the North Sea fell by 74% between 2000 and 2025, while oil output fell by 75%.

This decline has occurred despite the previous Conservative government, which was in power from 2010-24, holding six new licensing rounds and issuing hundreds of new oil and gas licences.

FALSE

Tice: “Why are the Norwegians drilling 49 new wells last year? Because they think there’s plenty more to go that’s worth going for. So, why are we so stupid that, on our side of the line, we think it’s a good idea to drill zero new wells?”

Bloomberg, May 2026

The UK has already used up most of the oil and gas that was under its part of the North Sea, whereas the state-run Norwegian system has taken a different approach.

Nevertheless, even the most optimistic of Norway’s official forecasts sees a steady decline in production over the coming decades, as their oil and gas also starts to run out.

UK fossil-fuel production is lower than Norway’s because of geology and the decisions that were taken in the past, neither of which can be changed by the current or any future UK government.

Specifically, the UK has already used up the large majority of its North Sea resources, having extracted around 90% of the oil and gas that is available.

In contrast, Norway has only used up 57% of the “expected recoverable resource” from its part of the North Sea, according to official estimates published by Norwegian Petroleum.

FALSE

Tice: “We’ve got lots of [oil and gas] reserves, but if you just say it’s not viable because you make the regulations and everything too expensive, then don’t be surprised if people say, well, there’s not much to go for.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Projections of the amount of oil and gas that will be recovered from the North Sea have barely changed since the Labour government took office in 2024.

Tice’s suggestion that official estimates of North Sea reserves have been revised down as a result of the Labour government’s policies is, therefore, provably untrue.

For gas, there is little difference between official projections published before and after the government’s 2024 election win and its decision to ban new licensing, as shown below.

North Sea oil (right) and gas production (right), million tonnes of oil equivalent, under the baseline NSTA projection or with further drilling. Source: NSTA.

While the NSTA projections for oil have shifted more noticeably between 2023 and 2026, this largely relates to output from existing fields, rather than the potential from new drilling.

FALSE

Tice: “I go to Aberdeen and they’re literally losing a thousand jobs a month in and around Aberdeen and the oil and gas industry because of this mad policy.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Jobs in North Sea oil and gas have been declining rapidly for decades, having fallen by a third between 2014 and 2023 – well before the current government took office.

However, the major driver of job losses has been the irreversible decline of the North Sea basin. Gas production in the North Sea fell by 74% between 2000 and 2025, while oil output fell by 75%.

This decline has occurred despite the previous Conservative government, which was in power from 2010-24, holding six new licensing rounds and issuing hundreds of new licences.

MISLEADING

Tice: “All of the nations who’ve got energy treasure, who are extracting it, they are growing, whether it’s America, whether it’s the Middle East, whether it’s in Asia.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Fossil-fuel producers have received windfall profits as a result of price spikes in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the effective closure of the strait of Hormuz.

On the flip side of this, countries that rely on fossil-fuel imports – particularly in Europe and China – have been hit with an extra $330bn in costs since the Iran crisis began.

For the UK, the most effective way to cut the need for costly fossil-fuel imports is to continue expanding clean-energy supplies and the electrified technologies that use them.

It is true that the US economy is growing at a faster rate than Europe’s. This is down to a range of reasons, experts say, including the nation’s rapid uptake of AI.

Another factor is that import dependency has left the UK and others particularly exposed to the economic impacts of the recent fossil-fuel price spikes.

Meanwhile, there is also plenty of evidence to show that investing in clean energy is driving economic growth in countries around the world.

The International Energy Agency (IEA), the world’s energy watchdog, estimated that clean energy accounted for 10% of global GDP growth in 2023. The figure was 30% for the EU, according to the IEA.

Analysis published by Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025. And the International Monetary Fund (IMF) says that climate action will provide a long-term boost to China’s economy and energy security.

In the UK, emissions have “decoupled” from economic growth, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

The analysis found that UK emissions fell to 54% below 1990 levels in 2024, while GDP was up 84%.

FALSE

Farage: “Countries that frack get rich. Countries that don’t frack get poor.”

Edinburgh press conference, August 2025

The availability and accessibility of shale resources – and, therefore, the potential economic return from extracting oil and gas via fracking – is a function of geography and geology.

The UK’s shale gas resources are hard to extract and roughly 10-times smaller than initially thought. As a result, their potential to boost the UK economy is extremely limited.

While fracking has boosted economic growth in the US, there is little evidence to suggest this could be replicated by countries in Europe. 

Only four countries frack for oil and gas at a large-scale commercial level: the US, Canada, China and Argentina.

Across much of Europe, fracking faces legal bans over concerns that the practice can contaminate water supplies and impact public health.

There are also practical and economic hurdles to fracking in Europe.

US oil majors abandoned efforts to establish a shale gas industry in Poland more than a decade ago. As the Economist noted in 2014: “There is no getting around geology.”

In the UK, fracking is unpopular with the public, with just 17% of people supporting it and 45% opposing it.

Any attempt to produce oil and gas via fracking would likely face protests and lengthy legal battles. Even if projects were able to go ahead, it would likely take years to produce a meaningful amount of gas .(See Carbon Brief’s fracking factcheck.)

Impacts and adaptation

MISLEADING

Tice: “Actually, what we need to do with climate change…we need to adapt to it.”

BBC Breakfast, June 2024

Climate change will keep getting worse until the world cuts emissions to net-zero.

Moreover, there are hard limits to adaptation, which can be overwhelmed by higher warming.

The longer emissions continue, the higher global temperatures will rise and the more nations such as the UK will have to adapt. It is, therefore, misleading to present adaptation as an alternative to cutting emissions. 

The IPCC says that risks “will become increasingly complex and more difficult to manage” as climate change worsens. It also stresses that there are limits to adaptation, some of which have already been reached.

In response to the latest IPCC assessment report, Dr Aditi Mukherji told Carbon Brief:

“Effectiveness of most adaptation responses decreases drastically at global warming levels of 1.5C to 2C, showing that mitigation and adaptation efforts have to go hand in hand.”

In its latest advice to the UK government, the CCC set out the need to prepare for extreme heat, drought and flooding and states: “Without global emissions reductions, these risks may go past the point where the UK can protect itself with adaptation measures.”

FALSE

Tice: “It’s much cheaper to adapt to climate change than to think you can stop it.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Cutting emissions to net-zero will be much cheaper for the UK than dealing with the economic damages of unmitigated climate change, according to the OBR.

In addition, adapting to unavoidable warming will be far cheaper than “facing the damages”, according to the CCC.

While Tice frequently presents a false dichotomy between cutting emissions and adapting to climate impacts, they are not either/or alternatives. In fact, both are required to reduce the dangers of climate change – and both will require substantial investment.

Climate-related damages are already costing the UK, with one recent estimate concluding that the June 2026 heatwave alone led to a £1.15bn hit to the economy.

These costs will spiral if global emissions are not reduced. It is well established that the cost of inaction on climate change is considerably higher than the cost of cutting emissions.

The CCC estimates that climate change is already costing the UK economy £60bn a year in damages and this could rise to around £260bn by 2050, under around 2C of global warming. 

The committee says a comprehensive climate-adaptation programme in the coming decades will reduce these costs. 

As the chart below shows, CCC analysis has concluded that an adaptation package covering heat and health, urban heat and water scarcity could avoid up to £12bn a year in climate-damage costs across the UK by the 2050s.

In total, climate-adaptation actions are expected to cost at least £11bn per year out to the 2050s – a considerable sum, but one that the CCC says is “manageable” and will largely come from private-sector investment.

At the same time, the CCC says there is a risk of “catastrophic damages”, especially if warming continues to rise above 2C. Given this, it stresses that “reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions remain essential” to minimise such risks.

FALSE

Tice: “The issue [with drought] is not the quantity of water in the UK. The issue is how the water companies do or don’t capture it.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Climate change is making drought more frequent and severe in the UK, even as it makes winters wetter than they were in the past.

This is increasing the need for new reservoirs and other measures to manage the quantity of water available in the UK throughout the year. 

The summer of 2026 saw record-low levels of rainfall across much of the south of England and Wales, as shown in the map below.  

July 2026 was the driest month on record in England and Wales, according to the Met Office. This coincided with the two nations recording their sunniest July on record as well. 

These “remarkable conditions” in 2026 come as part of a summer “marked by multiple heat records, which have contributed to drought conditions”, the Met Office notes.

The Environment Agency says that, due to climate change, “we are experiencing longer, hotter summers…leading to an increased likelihood of drought”.

FALSE
Tice: “I’m old enough to remember 1976. This feels a bit the same. That was 50 years ago.”

Press conference, August 2026

Since 1976, global warming has made heatwaves “more frequent, long-lasting and intense”.

As a result, summer 2026 was the UK’s hottest on record, with the Met Office finding that this was made around 130-times more likely by human-induced climate change.

Moreover, this year’s record means that summer 1976 is now only the seventh-warmest for the UK, with the top five all having occurred since 2003.

In the summer of 1976, there were 15 consecutive days when somewhere in the UK was above 32C. This led to water shortages and frequent wildfires, followed by flash floods.

There has been a lot of comparison to this “historic event” amid the record-breaking temperatures seen in 2026.

However, climate change means that a 1976-style weather pattern would be 3-4C hotter today than it was at the time.

There were just three days in which UK temperatures breached 36C in the entire 20th century, including 1976. Yet there were three days above 36C in 2026 alone.

Summer 2026 also saw 10 separate days with temperatures above 35C, breaking the previous record of five days, which had been set in 1976.

Additionally, the humidity was much higher in 2026 than in 1976. According to the Met Office, this meant that “even where peak air temperatures were comparable, the perceived heat and associated health risks were often greater in 2026”.

Clean energy

MISLEADING

Tice: “80% of the offshore renewables is overseas owned. So the British consumer is being shafted to help overseas investors.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Around the world, more than 90% of new renewable power projects are cheaper than new fossil-fueled generation.

An energy system built around renewable power and electrified technologies such as EVs   is also the lowest-cost option in the UK.

While it is true that more than 80% of UK offshore windfarms are owned by foreign companies, this is just ​​a feature of the country’s privatised energy sector.  

For example, 40% of North Sea oil and gas licences are also owned by foreign investors. 

Additionally, regardless of the windfarms’ owners, their presence on the electricity grid is helping to protect consumers from high fossil-fuel prices. 

In 2025, windfarms cut wholesale power prices by a third, according to the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit thinktank. 

MISLEADING

Tice: “Why are we so stupid that we spent £700m on Hinkley Point C, £700m of taxpayers’ cash, to protect a bunch of salmon? About 70 salmon, for God’s sake.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant will include a system designed to protect millions of fish. 

However, the cost of this system amounts to just 1.5% of the overall £46bn cost of building the new reactors in Somerset. 

The £700m system is expected to stop more than 2.6m fish a year from being sucked into the cooling pipes at the site on the Severn estuary. 

Additionally, the use of the system is replacing plans to flood 900 acres (364 hectares) of farmland in neighbouring Gloucestershire, originally proposed by the site’s main developer, EDF. 

The construction of Hinkley Point C is being financed by EDF and the China General Nuclear Power Group, not the taxpayer. When it begins generation, it will benefit from a “contracts for difference”, which is funded via electricity bills.  

MISLEADING

Tice: “A hell of a lot more people have died building wind turbines than have died in the nuclear power industry. Little stated fact by the renewable industry.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Both wind and nuclear power are considered to be among the safest forms of energy generation in the world.

There are occasional fatalities among workers at windfarm construction sites, but these are very rare, particularly when compared with accidents in the fossil-fuel industry. 

This is before taking into account that fossil-fuel pollution is responsible for one in five deaths globally, according to research by University College London. 

Death rate from accidents and air pollution. Nuclear energy deaths include those from the Fukushima and Chornobyl disasters. Deaths from hydropower include those from the Banqian Dam failure in China.

Analysis from 2020 suggests that solar power was the safest source of energy, followed by nuclear and then wind. All three clean-energy sources are orders of magnitude safer than fossil fuels, as shown in the figure below.

For example, each unit of electricity generation from coal is associated with more than 600 times as many deaths as the same amount of power from wind.

Our World in Data, a non-profit collaboration between the University of Oxford and the Global Change Data Lab, which did the analysis, explains:

“People often focus on the marginal differences at the bottom of the chart – between nuclear, solar and wind. This comparison is misguided: the uncertainties around these values mean they are likely to overlap.

“The key insight is that they are all much, much safer than fossil fuels.”

MISLEADING

Tice: “[Solar is a] good use of rooftops, there’s no subsidy on those.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Solar power is the cheapest electricity in history and keeps getting cheaper.

It is expected to play a key role in the energy transition, including in the UK.

While the government’s subsidy scheme for domestic solar – the “feed-in tariff” (FiT) – closed to new applicants in 2019, several other incentives have subsequently been introduced.

It was directly replaced by the “smart export guarantee”, wherein utilities pay households for any excess power they generate from their solar installations. This – together with the savings from using self-generated power – helps to offset the cost of the installation of solar panels. 

Additionally, the government’s warm homes plan offers grants and loans designed to triple the number of homes with rooftop solar by 2030. 

Ultimately, Tice’s focus on rooftop solar (which his firm uses) positions it in opposition to ground-mounted solar farms – creating a false dichotomy between a “good use” and a “bad use”. 

Ground-mount solar is set to play a significant role in decarbonising the UK. It is much cheaper than rooftop solar and is not limited by the availability of rooftops. 

FALSE

Tice: “All the renewables, all the wind turbines and the solar farms, they want a fat subsidy for very long-term contracts.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Renewables are the cheapest source of new electricity in the UK, where recent surges in energy bills have been predominantly due to the role of gas in setting electricity prices.

The first subsidy-free solar farm in the UK was opened in 2017 near Flitwick in Bedfordshire. 

Across the UK, there are now a number of subsidy-free solar and windfarms, which either rely on selling power into the market or private power purchase agreements. 

The majority of solar and windfarms hold government contracts, but these are fixed-price deals rather than subsidies. 

The new wind and solar projects secured at the latest government auction of “contracts for difference” will be significantly cheaper than new gas, according to the government.

No new gas plants have been built in the UK without long-term subsidy contracts through the government’s capacity market. In addition, the price of fuel for gas-fired generation continues to spike in response to the latest global energy crisis in the Middle East.

The most recent large new gas plant was Keadby 2, which opened in 2023 and would now cost 3.5-times as much to build, according to its owner.

FALSE

Tice: “There is nothing environmentally friendly about covering 100 square miles of Lincolnshire, agricultural, productive farmland, with solar panels, surrounding whole villages, decimating property prices in those villages or making them unsaleable, and thinking that’s going to end well.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

Even if solar farms expand in line with net-zero targets, they would cover just 0.7% of land in the UK – less than golf courses do currently. 

Solar farms are very rarely built on productive agricultural land in the UK – with the majority built on low-grade land – and pose “no threat to national food security”, according to the National Farmers Union. 

There is limited evidence that property prices are impacted by solar farms, with some studies suggesting that well-screened solar farms have no impact.

A London School of Economics study from 2021 did “not find any statistically significant effects [of solar on house prices], even at relatively small distances of 1km”. 

Other studies have found very small negative impacts – on the order of 1-3% – while one study of 70 solar farms in the US identified a small boost to house prices.

As such, there is nothing to suggest that solar farms either “decimate” property prices or make homes “unsaleable”. 

FALSE

Tice: “I drive a Tesla. Do I think it’s going to change the climate? No.”

Bloomberg, May 2026

As an electric vehicle (EV), driving a Tesla is far better for the environment than a petrol or diesel car, as it produces fewer greenhouse gases, air pollutants and noise. 

Typically, an EV driven in Europe emits around two-thirds fewer greenhouse gas emissions than an equivalent petrol car, even accounting for battery production and disposal. 

Carbon Brief analysis found that a Tesla Model Y, for example, will emit about 68% less CO2 over its lifetime than the average petrol car. 

In addition to cutting costs for drivers, EVs are a key part of decarbonising road transport.

In the UK, transitioning away from petrol and diesel vehicles to EVs is expected to account for 23% of the total reduction in emissions being targeted by 2050. Net-zero is the “only way” to halt global warming. 

MISLEADING

Tice: “The government says that the cost of renewable subsidies in the last 15 years is £100bn.”

Press conference, February 2025

Upfront renewable subsidies – in the UK and elsewhere – have helped deliver dramatic reductions in the cost of wind and solar power.

Since 2010, the cost of solar power has fallen by 89%, onshore wind by 71% and offshore wind by 63% – and these declines are set to continue.

As a result, 90% of new wind and solar installed in 2025 was cheaper than new fossil-fuel power, according to the International Renewable Energy Association (IRENA).

In the UK, wind power saved consumers more than £100bn between 2010-2023, after accounting for renewable subsidies, according to researchers at University College London.

In contrast, high fossil-fuel prices since the global energy crisis in 2022 had already cost the UK more than £180bn by the end of 2025, according to ECIU, with the first six months of the Iran crisis adding another £10bn in extra costs. 

FALSE

Tice: “Those farmers who want to sell out to the renewable industry for solar farms – you can’t have it both ways, folks. Either you’re part of food production, part of food security for our nation, or you’re part of the renewables industry.”

Press conference, February 2025

Contrary to Tice’s claims, farmers can – and indeed often already do – “have it both ways”. Government statistics for 2023/24 suggest that 32% of farm businesses make use of renewable energy, mostly solar power. 

Furthermore, some 37% of farmers, landowners and tenant farmers say the revenue from solar power helps secure their farms for future generations, according to interviews carried out by trade association Solar Energy UK. 

Finally, solar can also be combined directly with food production through the use of “agrivoltaic” systems. This concept combines farming – including livestock grazing and shade-tolerant crops – with solar panels and has been gaining momentum as a solution to land-use conflicts.

FALSE

Tice: “The British people are not being told that these battery energy systems are dangerous – and until they can be proven to be absolutely safe, they should be banned.”

Press conference, February 2025

Battery energy storage systems are safe and getting safer all the time. 

In the UK, there are over 1,659 large-scale battery storage projects and there have been only two reported fires in the past five years – neither of which had any injuries or fatalities.

Home battery storage systems are also safe. A recent study that looked at installations in Germany found the probability of a fire is 0.005% – this is around the same level as a tumble-dryer fire, 50 times lower than a general house fire and 18 times lower than a petrol or diesel engine fire.

(In contrast, there has been a spate of fires at UK waste facilities caused by the inappropriate disposal of lithium batteries in consumer devices, usually vapes.) 

FALSE

Farage: “The argument that wind power makes us less reliant on other sources of energy from around the world just is not true. The national grid is not fit to deal with intermittent renewable energy.”

Press conference, August 2025

Wind power is already making the UK less reliant on imported fuels.

Moreover, expanding clean-energy supplies will be a much more effective route to reducing the UK’s reliance on energy imports than efforts to increase North Sea drilling.

ECIU found that the growth of offshore wind had reduced the nation’s spending on imported fuels by at least £30bn by the end of 2025. 

Separately, Carbon Brief analysis found that wind and solar saved the UK from gas imports worth £1.7bn in March and April 2026 alone, amid the pressures of the Iran war. 

The UK’s electricity grid does require upgrades as part of the transition to an energy system dominated by renewables, EVs and heat pumps. This transition will enable the UK to cut its imports of not only gas for heat and power, but also oil for transport.

Regardless of net-zero targets, higher spending on the electricity network is partly making up for decades of “under-investment”.The grid needs upgrades to connect new nuclear plants and data centres, as well as to meet growing electricity demand from homes and businesses.

Despite the need for investment, there is nothing to suggest that the grid is “not fit to deal” with renewables.

Power cuts for the average UK household are now happening 43% less often than they did in 2011. During that time, renewables have grown from 9.5% to 47% of electricity supplies.

Related Revealed: England’s June 2026 heatwave sparked record demand for ambulances 14.09.2026 Health and society Revealed: More than 1,000 NHS operations cancelled due to record UK heatwaves 11.09.2026 Health and society UK aviation emissions to be 50% higher than thought by 2050, government admits 10.09.2026 Aviation and shipping Analysis: UK solar power hits record high over summer 2026 04.09.2026 Renewables

The post Factcheck: Reform UK’s 45 false or misleading claims about climate and energy appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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More than 1,000 operations at NHS hospitals were cancelled due to heat during the UK’s record May and June heatwaves, Carbon Brief can reveal.

This includes 167 orthopaedic surgeries, such as knee and hip replacements, as well as heart, eye and skin cancer operations.

At least 10 emergency surgeries – those for “life-threatening” conditions – had to be cancelled because of the record-breaking heat, according to the investigation.

Carbon Brief sent freedom-of-information (FOI) requests to 140 NHS trusts to investigate the impact of heatwaves on operations being cancelled in England and Wales.

Areas with the most operations cancelled due to heat include Surrey and Sussex, south Essex and parts of London – all regions experiencing among the highest temperatures.

High temperatures can threaten patient safety by stopping the ventilation systems used in theatres from working, increasing the risk of infection, experts tell Carbon Brief.

Less than half of the NHS trusts provided details of heat-related surgery cancellations – and Carbon Brief understands that many hospitals do not routinely record this information.

Carbon Brief’s figure is therefore likely to be a significant underestimate, but still provides an unprecedented insight into a surgical system “poorly prepared” for heatwaves and the impact on patients.

Overheating operations

The record-breaking heatwaves that have repeatedly struck the UK in 2026 – amplified by climate change – have already been linked to thousands of deaths. 

High temperatures can lead to all sorts of health complications and worsen respiratory, cardiovascular and kidney diseases. 

Extreme heat also threatens healthcare systems. News outlets have reported on the NHS “struggling”, as it faces record A&E demand, hospital wards reaching “unsafe” temperatures and equipment failing due to heat.

Among these reports was coverage of hospitals being forced to cancel operations, or even abandon them midway through, as surgical theatres became intolerably hot.

To investigate this problem, Carbon Brief sent FOI requests to the 140 NHS trusts and health boards in England and Wales responsible for hospitals with surgical theatres.

They were asked about all the operations that were cancelled due to extreme heat during the May and June heatwaves, when “amber” and “red” heat warnings were in place.

In total, 59 trusts and health boards responded with details of 1,110 heat-related cancellations across the 17-day period covering 22-28 May and 18-27 June.

(Of the 63 trusts that responded but did not provide details of heat-related disruption, many said that they simply did not record this data, rather than stating that heat was not a problem. See Methodology for more details.)

The map below shows the location of these cancelled surgeries, which cover everything from routine hernia operations to heart surgeries.

Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust reported the most cancellations – 140 in total – all in the surgery unit at Crawley Hospital. This hospital was in one of the hottest parts of the country in June, with temperatures approaching 36C.

Other hotspots for cancellations include south Essex, Dudley in the West Midlands, south Wales and parts of London. Many of the hardest-hit hospitals were in southern England, where temperatures were highest. 

Of the trusts that provided full datasets of all surgery cancellations in the period, around 7% were heat-related. This data illustrates how heat is placing more strain on an already stretched NHS, adding to existing issues such as staff shortages and lack of beds.

Nearly all of the cancelled surgeries were “elective”, meaning they were scheduled in advance and not immediately life-saving. Nevertheless, the list of cancellations includes at least eight heart operations and seven skin-cancer removals.

There were also 10 “emergency” operations cancelled due to heat in surgical theatres. Another 18 surgeries had to be abandoned mid-way through.

Dr Dmitri Nepogodiev, a public health researcher focusing on surgery at the University of Birmingham, says hospitals will always prioritise “time-sensitive, life-threatening” surgeries. 

Nevertheless, he tells Carbon Brief that every cancellation can cause significant “distress” and harm to patients’ quality of life, adding:

“Behind all of these statistics…are real people who have probably already been waiting a long time.”

Each dot in the graphic below indicates a cancelled surgery. Of the 596 for which trusts provided details, 167 are orthopaedic surgeries, such as knee and hip replacements.

Eye surgeries, gynaecological and urological surgeries are also among the most frequently cancelled, broadly reflecting how common such procedures are.

Richard Egan, an endocrine surgeon and a national clinical director within NHS Wales, notes the knock-on effects of cancelling surgeries for several days during heatwaves. He tells Carbon Brief:

“That’s a significant impact on waiting lists…For every week that patients are waiting on a waiting list, their condition could get worse and deteriorate.”

‘Increased risks’

When providing specific reasons for cancellations, most NHS trusts simply indicated that surgical theatres were “too hot and humid”. 

Sometimes, this was accompanied by comments about “risk of infection” or “overheating for both patients and staff”.

There are several reasons why it can get “too hot” for operations to take place, but the main one is that the complex ventilation systems installed in theatres can stop working above a certain temperature, explains Dr Ed Robinson, an NHS anaesthetist. He tells Carbon Brief:

“An operating theatre is a very tightly engineered clinical environment. There are quite complicated ventilation systems, which dilute airborne contaminants, remove fumes from different [medications] and anaesthetic gases.

“We have generalised airflow systems that make the air in theatre flow outwards to adjacent areas, so pathogens and fumes get carried away from the patient into non-clinical areas. When it gets to a certain heat, those systems can fail.”

These systems are also responsible for controlling heat and humidity levels inside theatres, says Robinson.

When the systems fail, it is not possible to guarantee patient safety, he continues, meaning surgeries may need to be cancelled.

Although most hospitals simply stated that it was “too hot” for operations to take place during the heatwaves, there were 48 cases where staff specified that this was due to air conditioning or ventilation units that were either broken or unable to sustain appropriate temperatures. 

Tim Lane, a urological surgeon and president of the Royal College of Surgeons of England (RCS England), tells Carbon Brief that heat places “extra physical strain” on patients:

“Extreme heat can increase risks and make it harder to deliver care under the conditions clinicians would consider ideal.”

If air in operating theatres is too humid, excess moisture can condense on surgical implements and transmit infections, he says.

Extreme heat and humidity inside theatres can also pose a risk to staff having to wear heavy protective clothing. Robinson explains:

“Staff are usually wearing PPE [personal protective equipment]. If it’s orthopaedics, they will be wearing ‘leads’ a lot of the time. This is because they will be doing lots of X-rays, and there’s no time to descrub and rescrub every time. 

“So if the ventilation system is not working, you’re going to overheat [and] that’s going to affect your ability to concentrate and perform a safe operation. You just wouldn’t start under those conditions.”

There are also “certain pieces of equipment and medications” that are not “validated to be used outside of certain ranges of temperature”, he says.

This includes specialised “cement” used to secure hip and knee replacements, which can set too quickly at higher temperatures, according to Lane.

‘Poorly prepared’

Following the record-breaking heat of 2022, one study found that surgical services in the UK were “poorly prepared for heatwaves”. 

Based on staff surveys, the study concluded that ambient temperatures “could not be controlled” in two-fifths of NHS operating theatres.

With hospitals once again under significant pressure this summer, health secretary Yvette Cooper told the Guardian that the NHS “has to make sure we are preparing for summer pressures now in the same way we prepare for winter”.

Nepogodiev notes that the problem of extreme heat extends from increased patient numbers to staff shortages, which can be the result of a range of wider factors such as heat-related train cancellations. He tells Carbon Brief.

“There isn’t a single magic solution because it’s a kind of complex, multifactorial challenge – so it also underlines the importance of broader preparedness.”

Egan, who is investigating ways to prepare surgical theatres for extreme heat, says the response so far has been “ad hoc”. He suggests it may be possible to continue with less risky operations, even at higher humidity levels.

As it stands, many NHS hospitals are old and not designed for increasingly extreme temperatures.

Government advisers at the Climate Change Committee (CCC) have recommended that all healthcare buildings should work to “maintain safe and appropriate temperatures” by 2035.

The UK’s national adaptation programme already says NHS England will work to “adapt NHS infrastructure to extreme weather events and overheating risks”, by incorporating adaptation measures into plans for new buildings. 

However, years of underinvestment have left many sites with what the King’s Fund thinktank calls “deteriorating buildings” and “outdated technology”.

Following the extreme heat this summer, the government has announced £32m from a £1.5bn spending programme for projects that strengthen hospitals’ “resilience to extreme heat, including improved “cooling and ventilation systems”.

RCS England president Lane tells Carbon Brief that heat-related surgical cancellations underline the need for investment in hospitals, ventilation systems and modern equipment:

“NHS staff work incredibly hard to adapt, often reorganising services and finding practical solutions to keep care running, but resilience alone cannot compensate indefinitely for outdated infrastructure or sustainability.”

Methodology

Carbon Brief contacted 140 NHS trusts and health boards in England and Wales, only including those that perform surgical procedures. Mental health trusts, community trusts and other specialist trusts were therefore excluded.

These requests covered the periods 22-28 May 2026 and 18-27 June 2026, when heatwaves affected much of England and Wales. 

At the time of filing the FOIs, these were the two periods when the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) had issued “amber” or “red” heat-health alerts across much or all of England. There were also comparable weather warnings in place across Wales for some of this time.

(Scotland and Northern Ireland were excluded from the analysis, on the basis that they did not experience such extreme heat.)

The FOI requests asked for details of all surgical procedures – both elective and emergency – that were cancelled during this period. Specifically, the requests also asked trusts to state which cancellations were related to extreme heat. Of these, 59 provided details of surgeries that were cancelled due to heat. 

Of the remaining 63 that responded to the FOI requests, only a few stated explicitly that there were no surgeries cancelled due to heat. Most either said that they did not record this information, or provided lists with standard cancellation reasons that may – or may not – indicate heat as a factor, such as “failure of equipment”. The remaining 19 did not respond to the request by the time of publication.

NHS trusts and health boards responded to Carbon Brief’s FOI requests in a large variety of ways, reflecting the inconsistent way in which heat-related cancellations are recorded.

Among those that disclosed data, some provided all the information requested while others only provided parts. Some would not provide exact numbers when the number of cancellations was five or less. In those cases, Carbon Brief assumed that two surgeries had been cancelled. (This assumption accounts for fewer than 50 of the 1,110 cancellations.)

The full dataset is available here, with details of all the surgeries cancelled and the reasons given for their cancellations.

related Factcheck: Reform UK’s 45 false or misleading claims about climate and energy 11.09.2026 UK policy UK aviation emissions to be 50% higher than thought by 2050, government admits 10.09.2026 Aviation and shipping Analysis: UK solar power hits record high over summer 2026 04.09.2026 Renewables How this summer’s heat and drought impacted crops in Europe – in six charts 04.09.2026 Food and farming

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Extreme heat is one of the deadliest climate hazards, but no two heatwaves are the same.

Heat extremes that happen outside of the peak summer months are often more dangerous because they can catch people off guard.

Heatwaves that hit during the spring or the first heatwave of the summer are riskier because  people’s bodies are not yet accustomed to the heat and cooling strategies, such as air conditioning or public cooling centres, might not be available.

On the other hand, heatwaves that happen in the autumn, after a long summer season of heat exposure, can place further strain on bodies and local infrastructure that are already under stress.

As the climate changes and global temperatures rise, research has shown that heatwaves are becoming more frequent, intense and lengthy. 

Our study, published in AGU Advances, is the first to measure whether the timing of extreme heat during the calendar year is changing around the world.

We find that, in more than half of the world, extreme heat events are spreading into the “shoulder seasons”, but doing so unevenly – in other words, they tend to creep more into autumn or spring, depending on the location. 

Defining heat seasons 

Meteorological summer is often assumed to be the warmest three-month period of the year. It is simplistically defined as June to August in the northern hemisphere and December to February in the southern hemisphere.

However, extreme heat seasons vary from place to place and do not always neatly map on to these defined periods. 

Our study, therefore, goes beyond traditional definitions of seasons and instead focuses on “local heat seasons”. We define these as the three consecutive months when extreme heat events happened most often in the 1980s. 

From this starting point, our research looks at how extreme heat is creeping into the two-month periods before and after a local heat season. We call these periods “shoulder seasons”.

This flexible definition of heat and shoulder seasons allows us to measure how the timing of extreme heat has changed over time. 

Specifically, we look at the percent of annual heat days that occurred in the heat season and shoulder seasons at each location on Earth and measure how those relative shares have shifted over the last 45 years.

For our analysis, we use climate data from 1980-2024 from the MERRA2 reanalysis dataset. To ensure our results were robust, we repeated the process using ERA5 reanalysis data. 

We picked the 1980s as our baseline decade as it was the start of the common time period between the two reanalysis datasets. We compared this to climate data in the decade between 2015-24. 

Comparing these two time periods – the opposite ends of our datasets – allowed us to register a larger magnitude change and account for cumulative effects of climate change.

We consider measures of both dry and humid heat, as each has distinct impacts. Dry heat tends to be more dangerous to plant and ecosystem health, while humid heat is more strenuous for humans.

We use the dry-bulb temperature and wet-bulb globe temperature as our measures of dry and humid heat, respectively. 

Created in the 1950s by the US military, wet-bulb globe temperature has a long history as an international standard used for outdoor sports and occupational hazard monitoring. It combines measurements of temperature, humidity, wind speed and solar radiation.

Changing heat seasons

Our research finds that, in the 1980s, extreme heat around the world was closely confined to a single heat season. For example, some 93% of the world’s land area experienced more than 80% of extreme dry-heat days during its traditional dry-heat season. 

Surprisingly, this was even true in the tropics, where there is much less of a seasonal swing in temperatures.

We also show that extreme dry- and humid-heat seasons are often different from one another, typically offset by one month. This is especially true in places influenced by monsoon systems, such as north-western Mexico and central India, where the extreme dry-heat season precedes the extreme humid-heat season. 

But, the edges of these extreme heat seasons are starting to blur. 

Extreme heat events are spreading out significantly in the calendar year in more than half of global land areas.

This extension of the extreme dry- and humid-heat seasons means that dangerous heat has started to creep into the shoulder seasons – but not equally so.

The maps below show how, in western Europe, southern Africa and north-western India, a larger fraction of each year’s extreme heat events are happening in the months before the historical dry- and humid-heat seasons. These regions are shaded in green.

On the other hand, in much of the US, eastern China, northern Africa and eastern Europe, extreme heat events are increasing in frequency in the months after the traditional heat seasons. These regions are shaded in purple.

Shift of the extreme dry- (top) and humid-heat (bottom) seasons, where green indicates a greater percentage of heat events in the two months before the traditional heat season (analogous to spring in the mid-latitudes) and purple a greater percentage of extreme heat events in the two months after (autumn in the mid-latitudes). Black shading indicates locations without a consecutive three-month heat season. Credit: Ivanovich et al. (2026) Boosting existing seasons

It is possible that these observed changes have a straightforward – and somewhat simple  – explanation.

In many regions, one shoulder season – spring or autumn – is warmer than the other. One hypothesis we explored was whether a simple step up in daily heat across the calendar year makes it more likely for extreme heat days to occur in one shoulder season over the other.

Our research shows that things are not so simple.

To investigate, we created a new, “synthetic” timeseries in order to identify the impact of annual average warming. To do this, we took the baseline 1980s timeseries and “shifted up” the data by the average change in local dry or humid heat between the first and last 10 years of our dataset (1980-89 compared to 2015-24).

We find that, in most locations, intensifying the baseline seasonality in a given location by warming evenly over the course of the year explains the changes in extreme heat timing within the traditional heat season.

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However, annual average warming alone cannot explain the uneven changes in how extreme heat is occurring in the shoulder seasons. 

As such, we conclude there must be other factors at play. 

Long-term changes in seasonal precipitation and soil moisture – whether drying or moistening – could be contributing. 

There could also be potential links to land-use changes, such as agricultural intensification or increased irrigation. Natural fluctuations in regional climates, caused by phenomena such as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation and Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation, could also be playing an important role.

To tease out the contributions of each of these drivers, scientists will need to conduct more regionally-focused studies.

Managing hazards

The expansion of extreme heat events into the shoulder seasons indicates that key protections, such as heat early warning systems and the establishment of cooling centres, may be needed outside the traditional summer months.

Further research is also required to look into whether the overlap of extreme heat with other seasonal hazards is increasing.

For example, we find that, throughout much of the US, there is a larger expansion of the heat season into the autumn than the spring. In the western US, extreme heat which stretches later into the year could increase the overlap between the extreme heat and wildfire seasons. 

Meanwhile, a similar extension of the heat season into the autumn in the eastern US could increase the overlap between the extreme heat and Atlantic hurricane seasons.

Understanding how the intersection of these seasonal hazards is changing is essential for developing targeted climate adaptation strategies, given that multiple hazards happening at once or in quick succession are much more dangerous than when they happen in isolation.

Ivanovich, C. et al. (2026) Extreme dry- and humid-heat seasons are changing asymmetrically, AGU Advances, doi:10.1029/2026AV002516

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The UK government has slashed its hopes for electric planes and “sustainable aviation fuels” (SAFs), ahead of giving the green light to a third runway at Heathrow.

An “ambitious” rollout of new technologies and efficiency upgrades will only cut flight emissions by a quarter over the next two decades, according to forecasts quietly released in June.

This would leave aviation emissions in 2050 nearly 50% higher than expected under the “jet-zero” strategy, launched by the previous Conservative government in 2022.

The Labour government has signalled its support for a contentious third runway at Heathrow airport, with a final planning decision expected by 2029.  

Ministers have justified this expansion by citing the rollout of clean-aviation technologies.

Yet, the updated forecasts suggest that rising flight numbers and a reduced role for “techno-fixes” will leave aviation emissions stubbornly high in 2050 – the UK’s legal target for net-zero.

If this is to be compatible with UK climate goals, then these higher emissions from flights in 2050 would need to be taken out of the atmosphere using costly and largely unproven “carbon dioxide removal” technologies – or by planting gigantic new forests.

Emissions up 

The previous government’s “jet-zero” strategy committed the UK to a “high ambition” pathway that would have seen aviation emissions peak at 38.2m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2019 and drop to 19.3MtCO2e in 2050.

At the time, the Conservative government said this “clear goal” was achievable, alongside airport expansion and rising flight numbers.

Its strategy relied heavily on the extensive use of early-stage technologies, such as SAFs and battery-powered planes, as well as wider fuel-efficiency improvements.

In public statements, Labour has broadly continued this approach, backing new airport runways while supporting SAFs as a way to curb aviation emissions.

However, the government’s latest forecast, quietly published ahead of the formal approval of a new runway at Heathrow, sets far lower expectations for these technologies.

Its “technology development” pathway, with “ambitious carbon abatement measures”, only sees emissions drop to 28.1MtCO2e in 2050. As the chart below shows, this is around 9MtCO2e higher than the jet-zero strategy’s stated goal – a roughly 50% increase.

The shift is down to much lower expectations for SAF uptake, fuel-efficiency improvements and the roll-out of battery-powered planes, as well as lower international carbon prices.

The government now expects SAFs to make up 30% of aviation fuel by 2050, rather than 50%. It also concedes that SAFs will save less carbon over their lifecycle than previously thought.

SAFs have faced considerable criticism, due to limited supplies and uncertainty around the extent to which they cut emissions. Even meeting the UK’s relatively modest goal of 22% SAF uptake by 2040 would require enormous – potentially unattainable – volumes of waste products, which are currently the main source of the fuel.

For its new forecasts, the government commissioned a separate analysis of likely aircraft fuel-efficiency improvements over the next few decades. This analysis, from the Aviation Impact Accelerator, yielded “less optimistic” projections than earlier work.

Fuel-efficiency improvements have therefore been revised downward from 2% per year in the “jet-zero” strategy to 1.3% in the new “technology development” scenario.

There is also a reduced role for battery-powered planes, with only some of the smallest zero-emissions aircraft expected to be in use by 2035.

Crucially, even making the more limited emissions cuts in the new “technology development” pathway would require greater efforts to decarbonise the aviation sector.

If the UK fails to implement new policies or innovations, while flight numbers continue to rise, then aviation emissions would be even higher in 2050 than they are today. 

This is illustrated by the pink “current trends” pathway in the chart above, in which emissions increase to 41.1MtCO2e by 2050.

This is roughly double the amount targeted by the jet-zero strategy and recommended by government climate advisors, the Climate Change Committee (CCC).

Budget ‘busting’

The new forecasts all account for the growth of several UK airports, including “planned Heathrow expansion”. Overall, passenger numbers would be at least 50% higher by 2050. 

In contrast, the CCC and other experts have advised that the rise in passenger numbers may need to be limited, in order to keep emissions down.

In order to meet the UK’s net-zero target, any aviation emissions that remain in 2050 would need to be offset by planting many thousands of hectares of new forest, or by relying on costly and largely unproven CO2 removal technologies.

Tim Johnson, director at the Aviation Environment Federation (AEF), says the new forecasts present “a more honest and realistic vision of what’s possible in the next 24 years”. However, he tells Carbon Brief:

“Less reliance on cleaner technology and fuels reopens the debate about the role and scale of greenhouse gas removals and ways to tackle the projected 50% growth in demand for air travel.”

AEF calculations, based on government data and shared with Carbon Brief, suggest that emissions from the third runway at Heathrow would initially be relatively modest, reaching 3.5MtCO2e per year in 2050. Its emissions would then be expected to rise significantly beyond the legal 2050 net-zero deadline.

Previously, the Labour government has explicitly cited SAFs and other new technologies as part of its justification for expanding Heathrow airport.

Dr Lois Pennington, a research associate at the University of Manchester who has analysed Heathrow’s emissions impact, says the government’s new forecast shows “we are projected to be well over aviation’s share of the carbon budget even before a third runway is considered”. 

She tells Carbon Brief:

“For Heathrow, it means expansion can no longer be waved through on the promise of technology, and any approvals will be in the full knowledge that it will bust our legally binding carbon budgets.”

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• What happened?
• How did bedrock collapse trigger the flash floods?
• How have temperatures risen in the affected region? 
• How have rising temperatures affected mountain stability?
• How have glaciers retreated in the affected region?
• Can the event be attributed to climate change?

On the morning of 26 August, flash floods surged through a Himalayan border region of Nepal and the Chinese region of Tibet, killing more than 1,300 people, with thousands still missing.

In the days since the floods, scientists have examined satellite imagery, drone footage and seismic data in order to understand and explain the forces behind the event.

While initial theories pinned the flood on a glacial collapse, scientists now understand the event as a “multi-hazard cascade”, which began with a bedrock collapse. 

Some climate sceptics have tried to use this to falsely claim that human-caused climate change had no impact on the event. 

Yet, scientists have noted that, while no formal attribution study has been carried out thus far, warming is making such ice-rock avalanches in the region more likely.

Researchers have highlighted how rapid warming is dramatically reshaping Asia’s high-mountain region – and identified rising temperatures, glacier retreat and permafrost thaw as factors that may have all contributed to the disaster. 

Balendra Shah, Nepal’s prime minister, has called the floods a “serious signal that…the risks we must bear in the Himalayan region are increasing” due to climate change.

Here, Carbon Brief unpacks what scientists currently know about the causes of the catastrophic event and what they can – and cannot – say about the role of climate change. 

• What happened?
• How did bedrock collapse trigger the flash floods?
• How have temperatures risen in the affected region?
• How have rising temperatures affected mountain stability?
• How have glaciers retreated in the affected region?
• Can the event be attributed to climate change?

What happened?

A report published on 28 August by the HiRisk scientific consortium of high mountain experts detailed the events that led to the flash floods.

It said that events were set in motion on 26 August when a mass of bedrock, as well as the glacier ice on top of it, broke off a slope of Langtang-Lirung mountain in the Nepalese Himalaya, plunging from approximately 5,200 metres above sea level to the valley floor at 3,000 metres. 

The landslide shook the ground hard enough that, at 8:37am Nepal local time, the US Geological Survey (USGS) initially reported a magnitude 4.4 earthquake. Later that day, it clarified the shaking was caused by glacier collapse and debris flow, equivalent to a magnitude 5.2 earthquake.

On the valley floor, the melting ice, water and debris slammed into the Lhende Khola river, a high-altitude river that runs along Nepal’s border with China. 

Known downstream as the Bhote Koshi river in Nepal and the Poiqu or Poqu in China, the Lhende Khole feeds a network of rivers across Nepal and the Chinese region of Tibet, including the Trishuli river. (In China, the Lhende Khola is known as the Donglin Tsangpo.)

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Carbon Brief concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Credit: Carbon Brief.

A large “debris” lake was briefly formed on the valley floor. When this lake burst, a wall of water and rock travelled downstream, killing more than a thousand people and destroying settlements, roads, bridges, hydropower plants and border posts across Nepal and Tibet.

HiRisk said that the floodwave travelled down rivers as fast as 30km an hour (around 19 miles per hour) and reached Mugling – a Nepalese town more than 130km downstream – at around 1pm local time.

A separate report from the Center for Land Surface Hazards in the US noted that the flood moved “exceptionally fast, was sediment-laden and extreme in scale”. For example, in the Nepalese municipality of Galchhi, the Trishuli river rose by nine metres in 30 minutes, it said.

Writing in the Conversation, Dr Umesh Haritashya, a glaciologist at the University of Dayton in Ohio, explained that the disaster “wasn’t finished when the first wall of water passed [on 26 August]”. 

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He continued that a new “barrier lake” – estimated to hold a few million cubic metres of water – had developed in a location where two rivers meet in Tibet before crossing into Nepal. This lake burst on 28 August and the river rose again, he said. 

On 4 September, the chief of Nepal’s National Disaster ​Risk Reduction and Management Authority, told Reuters that property and infrastructure worth “at least” $2.5bn (£1.9bn) had been lost. Dharma Raj Upreti estimated the cost to build roads and temporary shelters, provide drinking water and ⁠restore power would be around $53m (£39m). 

How did bedrock collapse trigger the flash floods?

In the immediate aftermath of the floods, initial reports suggested that the trigger was a collapsing glacier or earthquake in the high mountains of Nepal.

After confirming that a seismic tremor was as a result of falling rock and ice, the USGS said the trigger was likely a “glacial collapse and debris flow”. This was widely picked up by the media. 

Subsequently, satellite imagery revealed that an “enormous chunk of the mountainous bedrock” beneath the glacier had also given way, reported the New York Times. 

Dr Kristen Cook, a geomorphologist at the Université Grenoble Alpes in France, told the newspaper:

“The rock that the glacier was sitting on collapsed…It was a much larger collapse than we were initially able to see in the satellite imagery.”

The result was a “deluge of rock and ice, which pulverized into mud and water as it surged down the mountainside”, the newspaper said.

Dr Jakob Steiner a geoscientist at the University of Graz in Austria, tells Carbon Brief:

“It was not a glacier that collapsed. It was the mountain below the glacier that collapsed and the glacier had no other chance but to go with it because it was sitting on top of it. 

“The trigger for that is something that we are not 100% certain about, but, in the end, it very much looks like simply a mechanical failure of the rock material because of stressors that have built up over a long period of time.”

Failures of “bedrock” – the hard, solid rock that sits below looser rocks and soil – are an “increasingly common occurrence”, says Prof Bethan Davies, a professor of glaciology at Newcastle University. She tells Carbon Brief:

“These massive landslides occur in mountain regions, commonly following rapid deglacierisation [the melting away of a glacier]. Similar events happened in the Chamoli event in 2021 [in the Indian Himalaya] and in the Blatten landslide last year in Switzerland. They’ve also occurred recently in Alaska.”

With a shift in focus from the failure of a glacier to the bedrock underneath, some climate sceptics seized on the development to falsely claim that climate change had not played any role in the disaster.

These include Dr Matthew Wielicki, recently appointed by the Trump administration to lead the US Global Change Research Program, on Twitter, as well as former Conservative peer and climate-sceptic commentator Matt Ridley in the Spectator. 

However, scientists have highlighted the likely contribution of rapid warming in the region. These factors include the thawing of permafrost and glacier retreat. (For more, see sections below).

Fundamentally, “this would have been a much less significant tragedy if it had been just a rock-slope failure”, notes Davies.

The initial landslide took a mixture of rock and ice into a valley that “contains buried ice” as well, she says, providing the water that “resulted in the hyperconcentrated flow, which took so many lives”.

How have temperatures risen in the affected region? 

Global temperatures have risen by roughly 1.4C since the pre-industrial period. However, this increase is not uniform across the planet, with some regions warming faster than others. 

A study published in Global and Planetary Change in June 2026 investigated changes in the Langtang catchment – a river basin in central Nepal, in which the Langtang-Lirung mountain is located, which eventually drains into the Ganges. Around one-quarter of the area is made up of glaciers.

The paper found that glacial areas of the catchment – found at 4,000 metres above sea level – warmed at 0.31C per decade over 1960-2023. This was “more than three times” the rate observed at a lower elevation weather station, the authors said.

Looking in more detail at the site of the glacial collapse, Dr Robert Rohde, chief scientist for Berkeley Earth, used ERA5 reanalysis data to show how temperature has changed at the 5,200-metre elevation site where the mass of ice and rock broke loose. 

Rohde’s analysis found that June-to-August temperatures have been rising at the site of the glacier collapse since the year 1940, with 2026’s summer the fourth warmest on record, behind 2024, 2025 and 2022. This is shown in the graph below.

Average summer (June-August) temperature at the ice-rock avalanche site over 1940-2026. Data source: Rohde, Bluesky (2026)

Rohde also found that the days leading up to the disaster recorded the hottest August temperatures ever experienced at the site. This is shown in the graph below.

Daily average temperature, from 1 June-1 September, at the ice-rock avalanche site. 2026, 2025 and 2024 are shown in dark, mid and light blue. All other years from 1940-2023 are shown in grey. Source: Rohde, Bluesky (2026)

On social media, Rohde stated:

“Given the warming trend, this Nepali glacier had probably been thinning and weakening for years, or even decades. But it ultimately failed during the warmest week in one of its warmest years on record. It would be a hell of a coincidence if global warming wasn’t at least partially to blame.”

How have rising temperatures affected mountain stability?

Many experts have linked warming temperatures in the region to thawing permafrost – ground that has been frozen for at least two consecutive years, whose thickness ranges from less than one metre to more than a kilometre. 

Steiner is part of a research team that has been using sensors to monitor permafrost in the region since 2014. He tells Carbon Brief that it is “pretty clear” the permafrost has been thawing “very actively” at elevations as high as 5,200 metres above sea level “for many years”. He adds:

“This means that the ground has, over the last decades, moved from being in a solid state into – at least, periodically during the warm season – patchy ground where some is frozen and some isn’t…

“If you have frozen ground next to non-frozen ground, you have dynamics happening between that because there are different densities and there’s movement happening, which is conducive to interventional failure – and that we know from many other cases.”

Davies also points to the “degradation” of perennially frozen ground as a factor in the disaster:

“This permafrost acts as a glue to hold together the rocks and, as it melts, the rock can become weakened.”

Permafrost thaw can also result in saturated ground, says Davies, which adds “pressure in the joints” of rock and can “facilitate” failure. She continues:

“Sources of the water include melting permafrost and meltwater from the overlying glacier. We know that this event happened during a period of warmth, but in the absence of heavy precipitation, pointing to ice melt as the source of water.”

A 2025 study of rock and ice avalanches in High Mountain Asia found that more than two-thirds started in areas “where permafrost is probable”.

How have glaciers retreated in the affected region?

Glaciers – frozen rivers of ice holding three-quarters of the global freshwater supply – are extremely vulnerable to climate change.

In the Himalaya, the rate of glacier retreat has doubled since the late 20th century, according to a 2019 study in Science Advances.

The Global and Planetary Change study found that glacier area loss rates in the Langtang catchment increased more than fourfold from 1964 to 2023 – with melting accelerating after 2000.

It added that glaciers in the region also experienced “fragmentation” and “widespread thinning” over this period.

The study noted that this loss “coincided with elevation dependent warming”.

The figure below provides an overview of glacier loss in the Langtang catchment over 1964-2023, with orange, red and dark red indicating areas of retreat.

In addition, green dots note points of glacier fragmentation, while blue dots show separation and pink show disconnection.

Glacier loss in the Langtang catchment over 1964-2023. Orange, red and dark red indicate areas of retreat. Green dots note points of glacier fragmentation, while blue dots show separation and pink show disconnection. Credit: Silwal et al. (2026)

In comments released by the University of Reading, Prof Maria Shahgedanova, a climate scientist researching climate impacts on mountain glaciers, said that the glacier involved in the floods had “retreated by approximately 450 metres between 1990 and 2020”.

She adds that this “potentially reduce[d] the mechanical support provided by the glacier to the underlying rock slope”.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Davies reiterates that the retreat of the glacier is “potentially a contributing factor” to the bedrock collapse and subsequent disaster.

This is because the removal of the glacier from the lower slopes leaves the “upper rock slopes less stable”, she says.

The most recent assessment by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development said that glaciers in the Hindu Kush Himalaya region are “rapidly shrinking” as a result of climate change. (This region extends 3,500km over Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan.)

It said this loss is threatening the safety of the nearly two billion people, including by increasing the risk of “glacial lake outburst floods” (GLOFs). A GLOF is a sudden and catastrophic release of meltwater from a glacial lake. 

Although this disaster was not caused by a GLOF, it is known that climate change is making such events more likely.

Can the event be attributed to climate change?

In the wake of the flash floods, climate campaigners, media outlets and Nepalese politicians have linked them to human-caused climate change.

However, many climate scientists have cautioned that it is too early to say precisely how climate change impacted the disaster. 

Davies tells Carbon Brief:

“These events happen so quickly that the exact causes and drivers can take a little time to uncover, especially if the event was a surprise and there had been no monitoring system in place.”

When trying to determine the role human-caused climate change played in the intensity or likelihood of extreme weather, scientists turn to the field of “attribution science”. 

To date, no formal rapid attribution study has been produced that attempts to quantify whether – and how – climate change contributed to the event.

Scientists have noted that climate attribution of ice-rock avalanches – which are typically driven by a variety of factors – remains limited, in part because of the lack of a long-term observational record of previous collapses in high mountain areas.

Meanwhile, the studies that do exist stop short of directly linking such disasters to climate change. For example, the authors of a 2021 study into the Chamoli ice-rock avalanche concluded that “we cannot attribute this individual disaster specifically to climate change”. 

However, they added, the “possibly increasing frequency of high-mountain slope instabilities can likely be related to observed atmospheric warming and corresponding long-term changes in cryospheric conditions (glaciers and permafrost)”.

In the aftermath of the disaster, many researchers have similarly highlighted that climate change could not be singled out as the cause of the disaster, even if warming likely increased the probability of its occurrence.

On the Climate Brink substack, Carbon Brief’s climate science contributor Dr Zeke Hausfather noted that a “definitive single-event attribution” of the more recent disaster “may never be possible” due to the “messy causality of rock-ice avalanches”.

However, he added that both the existing scientific literature and “essentially every scientist working on these hazards point in the same direction” – namely, that warming is making such events more likely in the Himalaya.

Steiner tells Carbon Brief it might be possible to attribute different factors that played a role in the disasters to climate change – for instance, the recession of the glacier – but it would be more difficult to do so for the event as a whole.

Part of the reason for this, he says, is that rock failures in this region of the Himalaya have occurred for millennia, well before humans started altering the climate. 

However, he continues:

“The physics of it is not something that has been made possible by climate change. This could have happened without it. But the chance of it happening – and the likelihood of it happening five years after a previous, similar event [in Chamoli] – we, as the scientific community, can be pretty confident about that [being increased because of a changing climate].

“This is because so many of the changes that we know are related to climate change can potentially drive the build-up to eventual failure.”

Ultimately, says Davies, a “careful attribution study is needed, but it is hard to argue that the rapidly warming climate is not having an effect in these regions”. She adds:

“A single event may have multiple drivers, but we are seeing an increase in these events and are likely to see more as the permafrost and glacier melt continues.”

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The post Q&A: What can – and cannot – be said about global warming’s role in the 2026 Himalayan floods appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Solar power generation in the UK reached a new record over the summer of 2026, as temperatures across the nation soared, according to new analysis by Carbon Brief. 

Collectively over June, July and August, solar farms and rooftops generated 8.8 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity in the UK*, as shown in the chart below. 

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Chris Hewett, chief executive of trade association Solar Energy UK welcomed the new record, adding that it was driven by “clear skies and continued growth in deployment”. 

This surge in generation took place amid the hottest summer on record in the UK, with five heatwaves between May and August.

Summer 2026 was the sixth sunniest on record, with more than 620 hours of sunshine, according to the Met Office. England and Wales – which experienced the most extreme heat – saw their second-sunniest summers on record. 

June 2026 was the hottest June in England since records began in 1884, according to Met Office data, while Wales and the UK as a whole experienced their second-warmest June. 

It was the driest July for England and Wales since records began in 1836, with some parts of London seeing no rain at all in the month, while Wisley in Surrey had no rain for 62 days. 

In England, temperatures peaked at 38.1C at Kew Gardens in London on 13 August. 

According to the Met Office, this summer’s record mean temperature was made 130 times more likely by climate change.  

Amid these hot and sunny months, solar power generation increased 23% from the same period in 2025. This is double the level of solar generation over the summer of 2021, according to Carbon Brief analysis. 

While solar panels can be affected by periods of extreme heat, the longer hours of daylight and higher levels of irradiation over the summer more than offset any efficiency losses. 

June, July and August all saw solar set new monthly records for solar generation – July saw the highest solar generation in a calendar month ever, with 3.3TWh meeting 15% of overall electricity demand for the month. 

As of the end of August, the total UK solar generation in 2026 stood at 17TWh – 13% higher than the same point in 2025. 

The number of solar farms and rooftop installations has grown substantially in recent years, helping to boost generation. Domestic rooftop solar accounts for around 29% of total capacity.

In 2025, the UK’s solar capacity reached 21 gigawatts (GW) by the third quarter of the year, according to UK government figures. This is a jump of 3GW, or 18%, year-on-year, as Carbon Brief reported in January. 

(Capacity is the maximum output possible from an electricity generation, whereas generation is what was produced over a certain time period, such as a day, month or year.)

According to the University of Sheffield, the installed solar capacity is now nearly 24GW. 

This includes nearly 172,000 solar installations that have been fitted across the UK since the start of 2026, according to recent government figures. In July alone, more than 19,800 rooftop solar panels were installed – the equivalent of one installation every two minutes. 

In total, nearly 1.7m households in the UK now have solar panels installed. 

Over 26 heatwave days this summer – periods of at least three days when temperatures exceed the Met Office’s county-level heatwave temperature threshold – UK households with rooftop solar panels avoided an estimated £86.7m in electricity costs, according to analysis by Utility Bidder.

Talking about the surge in solar generation this summer, Hewett says: 

“[It] not only kept bills down for people with solar and batteries in their homes, but helped keep overall power prices much lower than they would have been if Britain had been relying on more gas generation during the day”.

Despite the record generation, no new half-hourly solar power output record was set in the summer of 2026. This still stands at 15.2 megawatts (MW) on 23 April 2026.

* This article refers to the UK throughout, but strictly relates to the island of Great Britain, made up of England, Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland is part of the separate, all-Ireland electricity system.

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The post Analysis: UK solar power hits record high over summer 2026 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Farmers around Europe are dealing with the aftermath of a summer of extreme heat, drought and wildfires that were exacerbated by climate change. 

Human-caused climate change is increasing the severity and likelihood of many extreme weather events around the world, which is increasing volatility for food producers.

This summer resulted in, for example, shrunken potatoes in the Netherlands, reduced carrot harvests in France, dried-up rice fields in Italy and scorched olive groves in parts of the Mediterranean region.

Global food prices are currently at their highest level since early 2023 due to “heatwaves and energy price dynamics”, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. 

Other factors such as blocked fertiliser supplies in the Strait of Hormuz and high fuel costs have also played a role in this year’s agricultural outputs. 

In the six charts below, Carbon Brief provides a snapshot of the impact this summer’s extremes are considered to have had on crop production and yields across Europe. 

1. Most EU countries expect to see declines in cereal production this year

2. Most countries are recording reduced crop yields

3. Around €2bn worth of cereal losses after June heatwave

4. UK yields of wheat, barley and oats are all due to drop in 2026

5. Maize production in France is due to hit a four-decade low

6. Declines in EU grains since 2025

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• 1. Most EU countries expect to see declines in cereal production this year
• 2. Most countries are recording reduced crop yields 
• 3. Around €2bn worth of cereal losses after June heatwave 
• 4. UK yields of wheat, barley and oats are all due to drop in 2026
• 5. Maize production in France is due to hit a four-decade low 
• 6. Declines in EU grains since 2025

1. Most EU countries expect to see declines in cereal production this year Changes in cereal production in 26 EU countries between 2025 and 2026. Malta is excluded due to a lack of available data. Source: European Commission.

France, in particular, will see heavy losses in the amount of cereals – such as wheat, barley and oats – it produces this year, according to European Commission data. 

French cereal production is expected to drop by almost 8 megatonnes (Mt) in 2026, compared to 2025. 

The chart above shows that most European countries, aside from Bulgaria, will also see production losses this year. 

Germany is due to see the second-largest losses in production, dropping by almost 4Mt compared to 2025.

Prof Til Feike, a cropping systems expert at the Julius Kühn-Institut, says many areas in Germany and Austria, as with other parts of Europe, have been “hit hard by a long-lasting dry period in combination with record-high heatwaves”.

This has resulted in dry grassland for animals and lower yields of maize, which is a “key fodder crop” for livestock. He tells Carbon Brief: 

“In the long run, farming must adapt better to more extreme weather conditions, not only heat and drought, but also prolonged wet periods. So, there is no one-fits-all solution for climate change adaptation.” 

2. Most countries are recording reduced crop yields 

Heat and a lack of water have “substantially worsened” crop expectations this summer in western and most of central Europe, according to a recent bulletin from the EU Joint Research Centre.

Yields are expected to be “significantly reduced”, with local crop failures “likely” in areas such as France, southern Germany, northern and central Italy, and Hungary, it added. 

The chart below shows that yields of cereal grains – which, here, refers to the tonnes of a grain grown per hectare of land – are expected to fall in most EU countries in 2026.

Changes in cereal yields in 26 EU countries between 2025 and 2026. Malta is excluded due to a lack of available data. Source: European Commission.

Slovakia, Austria and Hungary are expected to see the largest declines in cereal yields, reducing by more than one tonne per hectare in 2026 compared to 2025.

The recent EU bulletin noted that irrigated crops performed well in Portugal this summer – the country with the largest yield increases. Other crops relying on rainfall showed growing signs of heat stress, it added.  

3. Around €2bn worth of cereal losses after June heatwave 

The record heatwave that hit many parts of Europe in June contributed to an estimated €2-2.3bn in cumulative grain production losses, as shown in the chart below.

Estimates of revenue lost due to changes in production forecasts between June and July 2026. Source: ECIU.

The intense June heat in western Europe would have been “virtually impossible” just 50 years ago, according to a rapid climate attribution study. It was the region’s hottest June on record. 

The Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) thinktank analysed June and July 2026 grain forecasts from Coceral, a European grain traders association.

ECIU estimated lost supply by multiplying the change in tonnes of grains between these two months by prices for harvest delivery in 28 European countries. 

Major grain producers France, Germany, Hungary and Spain accounted for 86% of the lost revenue, according to the ECIU.  

Extreme heat is also expected to have a wider economic impact across the continent. Analysis from Triodos Bank found that this summer’s extreme weather could reduce the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) by around 1% this year, or around €180bn. 

4. UK yields of wheat, barley and oats are all due to drop in 2026

If current trends continue, the average yields for cereals and oilseeds will result in the UK’s worst harvest since detailed records began in 1984, according to ECIU.  

Yields of cereals and oilseed rape in the UK over 1990-2026. Source: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board.

Barley yields could fall by 15%, oats by 14% and wheat yields by 6% year-on-year, according to 2026 harvest surveys from the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board, a non-departmental public body that provides agricultural data to the UK government. 

ECIU said that, even if the situation improves, this year is still expected to be one of the five worst harvests on record. This means that four of the five worst harvests in the UK have occurred in the past decade. 

Consumers will likely see higher prices and/or smaller vegetables in supermarkets as a result, Tim O’Malley, chairman of UK company Nationwide Produce, told BBC News in August.

Other crops, such as berries, have grown successfully in the extreme heat. But the Guardian noted fears this could dip later this year “as plants become exhausted from heavy cropping during the heatwave”. 

5. Maize production in France is due to hit a four-decade low 

France has been acutely affected by this summer’s extreme weather, with more than 7,300 excess deaths during heatwaves and a record number of weather stations recording temperatures of above 40C. 

The country is the EU’s largest agricultural producer, but heat, drought and wildfires have affected many crops. 

The chart below shows that maize production is set to drop by more than one-third (35%) year-on-year. 

Maize production in France over 1980-2026. Source: Agreste.

This could result in France’s lowest maize production since 1980, according to data from Agreste, the country’s agriculture ministry’s statistics service.  

Due to the heat, “record-early” grape harvests have also been recorded in various parts of the nation since mid-July, reported Le Monde. In some cases, this means “smaller, less juicy grapes, which will yield less wine”, explained the newspaper. 

6. Declines in EU grains since 2025 Production of cereal crops in Europe over 1993-2026. The “other” category includes oats, rye, sorghum, millet and buckwheat. Source: European Commission.

Overall in the EU, data and projections indicate declines in the output of cereal grains this year. 

Cereal production is set to fall by 9% compared to 2025, according to the European Commission. 

Just one year in the past decade – 2024 – recorded lower production levels. 

Maize production is set to be particularly affected, with projections indicating a 13% drop, to 52Mt – the lowest level in the EU since 2007. 

related Livestock heat deaths in transit doubled in UK record-hot summer of 2025 25.06.2026 Food and farming Q&A: What England’s new ‘land-use framework’ means for climate, nature and food 20.03.2026 Food and farming Mapped: How extreme weather is destroying crops around the world 11.03.2026 Food and farming Adopting low-cost ‘healthy’ diets could cut food emissions by one-third 21.01.2026 Food and farming

The post How this summer’s heat and drought impacted crops in Europe – in six charts appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the second quarter of 2026, as oil consumption plummeted amid the strait of Hormuz crisis.

The country’s use of oil fell by 9% overall and by 16% for transport, after the disruptions to supply from the Gulf through the strait.

This guest post is by:

Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air

China’s total CO2 emissions fell despite a continued rebound in coal-fired power generation.

This is the first time that reductions in oil consumption have been responsible for a fall in CO2 emissions overall – in all previous cases, coal consumption has been the main driver.

Other key findings for the second quarter of 2026 include:

• Electric vehicles (EVs) and public transport have become key factors in China’s oil demand, enabling transportation levels to increase even as fuel use fell sharply.
• The effect of EVs on oil consumption was almost twice as large as would be expected based on the increase in the number of EVs on the road alone, as the usage of existing EVs surged.
• Oil consumption displaced by EVs in China in the first half of 2026 exceeded the UK’s total oil consumption over a six-month period.
• These structural factors are not sufficient to account for the size of the fall in oil consumption, leaving behaviour changes as the other explanation.
• “Curtailment” of solar and wind output caused coal power to rise, despite strong hydro output, solar and wind capacity growth, as well as slower demand growth.
• Major increases in coal-power capacity and a power market that continues to favour coal limited the amount of coal generation displaced by new wind and solar capacity.
• Defying expectations of a boom, annual growth in coal use for chemicals production slowed down to 8%, from 15% in 2025 and 19% in the first quarter.

The second quarter of 2026 was a busy time for China’s government planners, with numerous energy-related five-year plan documents being released.

These plans list new measures to address solar and wind curtailment, as well as signalling a higher bar for the approval of new coal-power plants, but add few new quantitative targets.

After a 2% increase in the first quarter of 2026 and a 1% decline in the second, emissions are up marginally across the first half of the year, but they remain below their peak in 2023-24.

In addition, China is on track to add enough wind, solar, nuclear and hydropower this year to cover electricity demand growth, despite a slowdown in new capacity.

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Given the structural pressures on oil demand, continued declines in real-estate construction and slower growth for coal-chemicals, China’s emissions could still fall this year. The emission trend remains a race between energy demand growth and clean-energy growth, both of which have slowed down this year.

Emissions still flat

There has now been a plateau in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement for more than two years, following a peak in March 2024.

Previous analysis for Carbon Brief described this as a “flat or falling” trend, which extended until the end of 2025. There was then a 2% increase in emissions year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026, resulting from a rise in the amount of “wasted” wind and solar power.

The latest analysis shows that this was followed by another decline in the second quarter of this year, when China’s emissions fell by 1%, as shown in the figure below.

For further details see: About the data. 

Notably, China’s emissions fell in the second quarter despite an increase in coal use. For the first time ever, a drop in oil use was sufficient to drive a decline in emissions overall.

Oil use plummeted while coal grew

Within the overall 1% decline in China’s emissions in the second quarter of 2026, there were divergent trends when looking sector by sector and fuel by fuel.

The largest fall in CO2 emissions came from the consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel, with oil consumption in industry also falling, as shown in the figure below.

For further details see: About the data. 

Crude oil processing volumes fell 11% in the second quarter, but some of the fall was absorbed by drawing down oil product inventories, with Sinopec sales down 9%.

In total, China cut back oil imports by 32% in the second quarter. The million–barrel question has been how much of this was enabled by genuine reductions in oil consumption and how much by the drawdown of the country’s vast oil stockpile.

Energy mix numbers reported by the National Bureau of Statistics indicate that oil consumption fell by 3% in the first half of the year and around 9% in the second quarter. This shows that reduced consumption played a substantial role, while still leaving 60% of the fall in imports to be covered by the swing from building stockpiles to using them.

The sector with the largest increase in emissions during the second quarter of the year was power, where coal use grew 2.4% while gas-fired generation fell 1.2%. This was despite strong growth in wind and solar capacity over the preceding year, a significant rebound in hydropower generation, a small increase in nuclear power output and a slowdown in electricity consumption growth.

The explanation for the rise in emissions was – similar to the first quarter of 2026 – an increased amount of solar and wind generation being “wasted” due to the power market and grid not being adapted to increasing shares of variable renewable generation.

In other sectors, there was a fall in cement production, driven by falling construction volumes, which accelerated to 9% in the second quarter, from 8% in the first quarter. Crude steel output fell by 1% and pig-iron production by 3% in the second quarter.

Growth of coal use for chemical production slowed down in the second quarter, both compared with the previous quarter and the last year.

The rate of utilisation of installed coal processing capacity was already high before the current oil shock, so there was no headroom for production to increase even though rising oil prices made coal-chemicals more profitable. Oil-based chemical production also kept growing, with ethylene output up 17% and primary plastics production flat.

Coal use for heating continued to increase, with the sector’s coal consumption in the second quarter dominated by industrial heat, as there is little need for space heating at this time of year. Growth has continued despite the prominent drive for “zero-carbon industrial parks”, demonstrating the importance of the initiative for tackling industrial coal use.

What drove the fall in oil consumption?

The dramatic fall in China’s demand for oil imports during the Hormuz crisis has been widely hailed as the most important price stabilising factor for the global oil market. 

To understand the implications for China’s oil consumption and CO2 emissions going forward, it is important to unpack what enabled this reduction in imports.

A significant contribution comes from ongoing, structural reductions in transport oil demand driven by electrification. Sinopec had forecast 6% and 5% drops in diesel and petrol consumption this year, respectively, already before the start of the war on Iran. Actual sales fell 9% in the first half of the year.

Transportation levels show a slowdown in growth, but no outright decline. Cross-regional passenger trips were 0.1% higher year-on-year in the second quarter, while urban passenger trips were 2.9% higher. Commercial freight tonnage increased 2.4%.

The exception is air travel, where passenger numbers fell 7% in May-June, after 7% growth in the first quarter. However, this sector plays a minor role in overall transport oil consumption in China.

The stable or growing transportation levels show that the shift to electric vehicles, rail, public transport and other clean transportation, rather than a fall in mobility, played the key role in reducing oil consumption.

The rise in fuel prices that accompanied the Hormuz crisis only accelerated the structural shifts in transportation that were already underway.

Electric heavy-truck sales rose about 77% in the second quarter, year-on-year, with June sales more than doubling and the market share of electric trucks exceeding 45% of all new sales.

The total number of EVs on the road at the end of the quarter grew 33% year-on-year. Some 12.1m EVs were added, of which 8.1m were electric-only battery EVs.

EV usage saw even more of a shift. Charging volumes increased 60% in the second quarter, indicating that EVs already on the road were utilised much more than before, at the expense of petrol and diesel vehicles, with plug-in hybrid drivers likely favouring electricity over fuel. 

One factor enabling EV utilisation to grow was the increased use of electric taxis. Intense competition in the sector has pushed prices down at the same time as the use of private petrol vehicles has become more expensive.

Stronger subway and rail use also made a contribution. Rail-passenger traffic increased 5% in the first half of the year.

The fall in diesel demand has been particularly pronounced in the construction and mining sectors. The heavy machinery in the sectors is well-suited for electrification, in addition to which construction levels are also falling.

Based on reported growth in charging volumes, EVs helped avoid an estimated 19m tonnes of oil consumption (Mtoe) in the second quarter, up 50% year-on-year.

This took the total amount of oil displaced by EVs to 36 Mtoe in the first half of the year, as shown in the figure below, well exceeding, say, the total oil consumption of the UK over six months. Notably, trucks are the fastest-growing source of oil displacement, with avoided fuel use up 90% year-on-year in the first half of 2026. 

For further details see: About the data. 

The increase in avoided oil consumption due to EVs is equal to 4.5% of China’s oil imports in the same period in 2025. If EV sales and charging volumes continue their growth at the same rates in the second half of the year, avoided oil consumption will reach 80 mn tonnes, equal to the consumption of Mexico.

Estimated emissions avoided are 35 MtCO2, or 1.3% of China’s total CO2 emissions in the second quarter, after taking into account emissions from power generation for vehicle charging.

While the amount of oil displaced by the shift to EVs is significant – and is rising fast – the year-on-year increase in displaced oil still only accounts for a third of the drop in China’s oil consumption in the first half of the year, with the fall in consumption only accounting for half of the drop in imports. The remaining reduction is due to the shift from building to drawing down stockpiles, slower growth in chemical industry output, as well as behavioral adaptations by consumers and operational adaptations by businesses.

Coal power continued to rise despite clean-capacity growth

China saw record increases in solar and wind capacity over the past year. In addition, hydropower generation increased 9% in the second quarter of the year, compared with the same period in 2025, and there was a small 2% increase in nuclear-power output.

At the same time, the rate of power demand growth slowed down from 5.9% in the second quarter of 2025 to 5.2% in the same period in 2026.

Yet, power-sector emissions increased 3.0% in the first half of 2026, after falling 3.2% in the first half of 2025. Power generation from fossil fuels rose because of an increase in the amount of potential solar and wind generation that was wasted, as well as exceptionally poor wind conditions. Without those factors, coal-fired power generation and power-sector emissions would also have fallen in 2026.

Wind-power capacity has continued strong growth in 2026, with capacity additions in both the first and the second quarter of the year comfortably exceeding those in any year other than the record-setting 2025.

Solar power additions have slowed sharply from the rates seen in 2025, even falling behind 2024. Yet, they are in line with 2023, when more than 200 gigawatts (GW) was added by year-end.

Nuclear power development continues at pace, with eight new reactors approved in July and five reactors with 4.5GW total capacity expected to enter commercial operation this year. This includes China’s second commercial small modular reactor, Linglong One, with new policies paving the way for further development.

Reactor commissioning will pick up further next year: the government has approved 10 new reactor projects every year since 2022 and those projects will begin to come online. Meanwhile, 3GW of conventional hydropower was added, with a total of 6GW of projects targeting operation in 2026.

Taken together, this clean-energy growth puts China on track to add enough non-fossil generating capacity in 2026 to cover electricity demand growth of up to 5%, despite the slowdown in solar.

Power demand grew 5.3% in the first six months of 2026 and the energy regulator projects 5-6% for the whole year. This means that the increase in power-sector emissions seen in the first half would be reversed, once the obstacles to solar and wind sending their output to the grid are addressed – and once wind conditions revert to average levels.

Moreover, total energy demand growth has slowed down much more sharply than electricity demand, making it more feasible for clean-power generation growth to significantly exceed the increase in total energy consumption and to drive down fossil-fuel consumption.

For further details see: About the data.

The key reason for solar and wind curtailment in China is that neither the power-grid operating model nor the electricity market model require – or encourage – the flexible operation of coal-power plants, hydropower plants and inter-provincial transmission lines. 

This situation has been exacerbated by a wave of new coal-power plants entering operation, with newly added capacity reaching 30GW in the first half of 2026, the highest level since 2016. Another 25GW started construction, while less than 3GW was retired.

The electricity prices paid to coal-fired generators are fixed months in advance, as are the volumes of electricity that will be transmitted through long-distance power lines.

This removes the incentive for plants to adjust their output in response to conditions. This could include variations in solar and wind supply, or changes in power demand.

As a result, there is limited ability for the grid to absorb variable renewable power. Furthermore, coal plants are entitled to “capacity payments”, which require them to be available to generate, but do not reward them for operating flexibly.

One solution to integrate more solar and wind into the grid is increasing energy storage capacity. Battery storage capacity continued to grow, with 17GW added in the first half of 2026, bringing total installed capacity to 153GW. This represents a slowdown in storage additions, however, down from 23GW in the first half of 2025.

Outlook for China’s CO2 emissions

The key developments affecting the outlook for China’s emissions in the second quarter include the effects of the Hormuz oil-and-gas crisis, the release of a long list of sectoral five-year plans and a slowdown in energy consumption growth.

The rise in oil prices has caused a stronger shift in China’s transportation sector than anyone anticipated, with EV deployment and use accelerating from an already high base. This trend is unlikely to be reversed. It has also proven the value of electrification to China’s energy security strategy. 

The government is targeting a slight acceleration in the pace of electrification, aiming for electricity to make up 35% of energy end-use by 2030, up from 30% in 2025. This is a larger increase than achieved over the past five years, when the share of electricity rose from 26.5% in 2020 to 30% by 2025. The transportation sector plays a significant role in this, with a target for EVs to make up 30% of the vehicle fleet, up from 12% in 2025, and 25% of commercial vehicles.

Electrification both reduces emissions immediately and sets different sectors up for deep decarbonisation as electricity is much easier to produce without CO2 emissions than fuels. Faster transport sector electrification lowers the outlook for oil demand, increases the role of the sector in peaking and reducing emissions, plus means that more of China’s clean energy growth ends up displacing oil.

While transport emissions fell, power-sector emissions continued to rebound for the second quarter in a row. The increased coal-fired power generation and emissions can be attributed to increased solar and wind curtailment. Curtailment has emerged as the key obstacle to both continued rapid solar and wind capacity growth and full utilisation of existing capacity.

Several sectoral five-year plans published in recent months have laid out measures to improve solar and wind utilisation.

Long-distance transmission will continue to expand, helping to move wind and solar generation from remote “energy bases” to centres of demand. There is also a growing emphasis on local consumption of clean power. The power sector five-year plan, published in August, promotes direct purchases of clean electricity, smart microgrids, zero-carbon industrial parks and closer coordination between renewable resources and AI computing infrastructure

Yet the same plan further loosened the limits on the amount of wind and solar that can be curtailed.

The limit for curtailment was 5%, until it was relaxed to 10% in 2024 in provinces with good wind and solar resources. The new plan allows the limit to be increased further to 15% for some provinces, while keeping it at 5% and 10% for others. 

Looking at the 2025 data on reported curtailment, very few provinces had higher rates than 15% – only Tibet for wind and Qinghai and Tibet for solar.

Unless the most lenient limit is only applied to those two provinces, it means the plan would allow for higher levels of curtailment.

This is also true of the national average target of “around” 10% curtailment, given reported rates in 2025 were 94% and 95% for wind and solar, respectively.

Notably, monthly data on curtailment has not been published in recent months, raising the possibility that the indicator is being revised. Reported data has understated actual curtailment by a wide margin, compared to implied curtailment.

If the curtailment indicator is revised, such that it captures more of the actual curtailment, then this could make the headline targets stronger than they appear, in comparison to previously reported numbers.

The new five-year plans also lowered the overall level of ambition on coal use. Chinese president Xi Jinping announced in 2021 that China would “gradually reduce coal consumption during the 15th five-year period”, covering 2026-30. However, the target now is for coal consumption to “enter a plateau” during those five years.

The five-year plans call for “reasonably controlling coal-power capacity and generation”, signaling a higher bar for the approval for new coal-power projects, after the government’s active promotion of new coal power in recent years. This could also imply more retirements of older coal plants. However, there is 204GW of coal-power capacity under construction, even after the wave of new coal-power plants starting operation in 2025 and in the first half of 2026, making the implementation of the “reasonable control” more challenging.

It is the first time that the government has vowed to control “coal-power generation” and not just “generation growth”, as the energy regulator did in 2021, but the significance of that distinction is unclear.

The renewable energy five-year plan also broadens the concept of system reliability, which was a key justification for new coal power during the previous five years. Rather than relying primarily on coal-fired power for system stability, it increasingly looks to other options.

Alternatives include storage, flexible demand, EVs, “virtual power plants” and smarter system operation to provide balancing services. The plan also puts an emphasis on increasing the contribution of renewable energy to meeting demand peaks.

Therefore, while coal remains an important backup resource in the plan, reliability is no longer framed as something that can only be provided by coal.

The Chinese government has published numerous other sectoral five-year plans since its overarching plan came out in March. These include plans for the energy sector (“new-type energy system”), power system, renewable energy, carbon peaking, coal, climate-change mitigation, and the environment (“Beautiful China”). Some clear priorities emerge from these plans: electrification, electric vehicles, energy storage, offshore wind and “green”” fuels.

The energy plan also substantially increased ambition on the development of conventional hydropower, despite ecological and social risks and potential for tensions with neighbouring countries. The capacity additions will largely only materialise after 2030, however.

At the same time, energy consumption growth has slowed down markedly after the surge during and immediately after the “zero-Covid” period, making it more feasible for clean energy to meet all incremental demand.

If this trend continues, then total CO2 emissions will begin to fall even as power-sector emissions continue to plateau.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.

Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Total primary energy consumption is converted to the electricity equivalent using the substitution method.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.

For oil, total oil consumption is calculated based on energy mix data for the first quarter and first half of the year released by the National Bureau of Statistics. Consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is estimated based on the sales growth reported by Sinopec for the first quarter and the first half of the year, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use. Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated as the residual.

Estimated non-energy use of fossil fuels is subtracted from total chemical industry fossil fuel consumption, and process emissions are calculated based on fossil fuel consumption with carbon retained in products subtracted. Emissions from the incineration of plastics are based on a peer-reviewed estimate of plastics incineration in 2022, combined with growth rates in the overall power generation from waste-to-energy plants. Metals industry process emissions are calculated using industrial output data and IPCC default emission factors.

Oil consumption displaced by EVs is estimated using China Association of Automobile Manufacturers’ sales data, via Wind Financial Terminal. The data breaks down vehicle sales by type and powertrain: passenger cars, buses, vans, semis and trucks of different sizes, each split into battery-electric and plug-in hybrid, with assumptions about how far each vehicle type is driven per year and the fuel economy of the conventional vehicle it replaces. 

Annual mileage and fuel-consumption assumptions are compiled from different sources, including the International Council on Clean Transportation. Each electric vehicle sold is credited with avoiding the fuel a comparable internal-combustion vehicle would have burned; plug-in hybrids are credited only with the portion of driving done on electricity (a utility factor of 64%).

The electricity and oil figures are calibrated to figures from China’s National Energy Administration, which put new-energy-vehicle charging at 142.3 TWh in 2025 and reported 56.9% year-on-year growth in the first half of 2026. The second half of 2026 is a projection: each vehicle segment’s actual second-half-2025 displacement is grown by its first-half-2026 year-on-year rate.

CREA data scientist Hubert Thieriot contributed to implementing and reviewing the CO2 emission methodology.

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The post Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions fall in Q2 2026 due to plummeting oil use appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas and the second-largest contributor to global warming after carbon dioxide (CO2).

Methane traps heat in the atmosphere more efficiently than CO2, but has a significantly shorter lifespan, fading after just a few decades.

Therefore, reducing emissions of methane – a gas primarily produced by agriculture, fossil fuels and waste management – is a powerful option for limiting global warming in the near-term.

Yet climate strategies and models often only focus on CO2, or combine all greenhouse gases into one metric known as “CO2 equivalent”.

The latter approach makes reducing methane emissions dependent on modelling choices and assumptions about the “equivalence” of methane and CO2.

It hides the opportunities and challenges linked to methane’s high warming and short lifetime.

In a new study, published in Communications Earth & Environment, we offer a different perspective that “decouples” CO2 and methane reduction and takes global warming limits as a starting point for determining the required level of methane cuts. 

We show that, even under the most ambitious existing national net-zero targets, an absence of methane reduction leads to peak warming that exceeds 1.85C above pre-industrial levels. 

The study highlights that, to limit peak warming to well-below 2C, net-zero CO2 targets must be complemented by stringent methane emissions cuts.

CO2 equivalent 

How much methane corresponds to one tonne of CO2?

The question is as difficult to answer as: ‘how much spaghetti equals a chicken?’ You could compare the two meals according to their calories, protein content or cost. Each metric can be convenient, but is only valid for that specific comparison – no amount of spaghetti is the same as a chicken. 

The same is true for the conversion of emissions of methane and other gases to CO2-equivalent emissions. It can be convenient, as it allows different gases to be compared or combined into a single number. This is why the metric is used in climate targets or evaluating the effectiveness of different mitigation options. 

But, because methane and CO2 have different atmospheric lifetimes and warming properties, any conversion is only valid for a chosen time horizon and a chosen baseline.

Depending on the assumptions baked into calculations, methane mitigation can either appear as an immediate priority or framed as almost unnecessary.

There are a number of metrics that scientists use to convert greenhouse gases – whether methane, hydrofluorocarbons or nitrous oxide – into CO2-equivalent emissions:

• “GWP20” measures how much heat a greenhouse gas traps in the atmosphere over a 20-year period, relative to CO2. It emphasises urgent methane mitigation but has been criticised for its implicit discounting of future damages.
• “GWP100” looks at a 100-year timeline. It gives more weight to long-term warming and is used in “integrated assessment models” (IAMs) used by scientists, national emission reporting to the UN and by the GHG Protocol used by companies.
• “GWP*” considers the rate of emissions, rather than warming over a fixed time horizon. Under GWP*, very limited methane reductions bring CO2-equivalent emissions to zero, meaning remaining methane emissions can be designated as causing “no additional warming”. (This interpretation remains controversial as it assumes the continuation of historical levels of warming.)

IAMs are the tools used to generate future emissions scenarios. Because they combine CO2 and methane emissions, the impact of methane emission cuts alone is difficult to isolate in existing emission scenarios.

IAM-generated scenarios also assume mitigation decisions driven by costs. Combinations of CO2 and methane emission pathways that are not purely cost-effective are, therefore, not represented, even though climate policy is messy and emission pathways are rarely cost-effective in the real world.

Only a few countries – including Japan, Mexico and South Korea – specify methane mitigation targets.

A different approach

In our study, we separate CO2 and methane emissions and treat them as independent. 

Instead of choosing a conversion method, we suggest that states and organisations set a limit on peak global warming first, then, based on their existing net-zero targets, determine the minimum compatible methane reduction target. 

Companies and countries around the world have set net-zero targets focused on CO2, as well as those that include all greenhouse gases. As a result, our research looks at the necessary methane reductions for both types of goal. We consider scenarios where companies or countries deliver linear – in other words, steady – emissions reductions to reach net-zero.

Using a simple climate model, we systematically combined methane and CO2 (or greenhouse gas) mitigation pathways starting in 2025 and calculated peak warming. 

The figure below shows how peak warming depends on both the year of reaching net-zero CO2 and the level of methane cuts.

Peak global warming relative to 1850-1900 reached until 2100 (50% likelihood), for combinations of the year of global net-zero CO2 emissions (x-axis) and the change in global methane (CH4) emissions between 2020 and that year (y-axis), assuming linear trajectories. Black lines are contours of equal peak warming. The three bars on the right show independent estimates of where CH4 emissions could or would land on the same vertical scale: CH4 mitigation available at no net cost (IEA, red), the 2030 mitigation potential (Global methane status report, orange), and the current legislation scenario for 2050 (Global methane status report, purple). Adapted from Weber et al. (2026).

The blue arrows in the figure show that to limit warming to 1.7C under a 2050 net-zero CO2 scenario, methane emissions would need to fall by at least 69% by 2050, relative to 2020. 

Our research also finds that, if an organisation or country’s 2050 net zero-target covers all greenhouse gases, its methane emissions would need to fall by 63% instead.

However, under current policies, methane emissions are expected to increase by around 20% by 2050, relative to 2020. We find that this pathway would result in peak warming above 2C by 2050 – even if global CO2 emissions were to reach net-zero by that date (see purple bar on the right-hand side of the figure above). 

The figure also shows how, if methane emissions remained at 2020 levels and net-zero CO2 was delivered by 2040 or later, warming would exceed 1.85C. This level of warming is above what has been argued as consistent with the Paris Agreement’s “well-below” 2C limit.

Conversely, cutting methane emissions by around one-third – in line with the Global Methane Pledge target for 2030 – could reduce peak warming by 0.15C, of which 0.05C could be delivered by interventions that come at no net cost. These are shown by the orange and red bars, respectively, on the figure above.

The table below highlights the minimum compatible methane cuts for three different peak warming levels and net-zero CO2 or greenhouse-gas emission targets.

Peak warmingYear of net-zero CO2 emissionsYear of net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions2050206021002050206021001.7C-69%––-63%––1.8C-32%-56%–-11%-47%–2C+8%-8%-83%>50%+33%-78%

Minimum methane emission reductions between 2020 and the year of net-zero emissions, consistent with peak warming of 1.7C, 1.8C, and 2.0C at 50% likelihood, assuming linear emission trajectories. For some net-zero targets and peak warming levels, there are no compatible methane mitigation targets (indicated by “–”).

.caption-fix{ font-size: 16px; font-family: 'PT Sans', sans-serif; font-weight: 400; text-align: start; color: #444444; max-width: min(765px, calc(100% - (2rem * 2))); margin: 0 auto } Remaining carbon budget

The global carbon budget refers to the amount of cumulative CO2 emissions allowable while still meeting a particular global warming threshold.

The 2021 climate science report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a 2023 Nature study estimated that, by 2025, the remaining carbon budget for holding warming to 2C would be around 1,000-1,150bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2). 

We find that these estimates are founded on the assumption of methane reductions of 27-35% by 2050, relative to a 2020 baseline. (A 2024 Communications Earth & Environment study reached similar conclusions.) 

Under the GWP* metric, where methane emissions are only cut to maintain “no additional warming”, the remaining carbon budget would be constrained. The best estimate of a 2C budget shrinks by around 30% to approximately 750GtCO2.

Finally, if methane emissions are not cut at all in the future, our findings suggest that the remaining carbon budget for 1.7C of global warming has, in effect, already been exhausted.

Our analysis shows how peak warming depends on both CO2 and methane reduction – and how methane-specific targets can help refine existing net-zero targets.

Crucially, we show that complementing net-zero CO2 targets with stringent methane cuts is necessary to limit peak warming to well-below 2C.

Weber, K. et al. (2026) Limiting warming by CO2 and methane mitigation in an expanded scenario space, Communications Earth & Environment, doi:10.1038/s43247-026-03832-1

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Every six to seven years, climate modelling groups around the world run a coordinated set of simulations that explore how the climate could change in the future. 

These simulations form a key line of evidence for future projections used in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment reports. 

They are built around a set of common scenarios – or “pathways” – of future greenhouse gas emissions.

A new set of scenarios has now been published for the seventh phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP7). 

These replace the “shared socioeconomic pathways” (SSPs) that drove the previous generation of climate models and featured heavily in the IPCC’s sixth assessment report (AR6).

The new scenarios are quite different from their predecessors in a number of notable ways. 

Rather than being named, somewhat enigmatically, according to their “radiative forcing levels”, the new scenarios are named simply by their emissions trajectories – ranging from “low-to-negative” to “high”. 

They no longer consider “no-climate-policy” baseline worlds, but instead explore the implications of current policies continuing, being strengthened, or weakening.

These new scenarios also dramatically revise high-end future emissions downward, far below the highest scenarios in prior generations, in order to reflect a world where a 21st century dominated by coal use is no longer plausible.

At the same time, they revise the lowest emissions scenarios upwards relative to those featured in the AR6, with at least some “overshoot” of the Paris Agreement’s “aspirational” target to limit global warming to 1.5C now “unavoidable”.

While modelling groups are just getting started on the full Earth-system model simulations, the emissions scenarios give a clear picture of the range of futures that will inform the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle (AR7).

Here, Carbon Brief unpacks how the new scenarios were designed and how they differ from the SSPs published almost a decade ago. 

The article also compares CO2 emissions and warming outcomes between the new scenarios and their predecessors, explores the range of future warming outcomes and examines why the high end of the scenario range has shifted markedly downward. 

Finally, Carbon Brief examines the scale of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) built into the scenarios and new extensions of scenarios to 2150 and beyond.

Key highlights from Carbon Brief’s analysis of the new scenarios include:

• The seven new scenarios give a range of global warming in 2100 from 1.6C to 3.3C above pre-industrial levels – markedly narrower than the 1.5C to 4.7C range in their SSP predecessors.
• The top of the scenario range has fallen for the first time in four generations of climate modelling. The highest scenarios used in the three previous IPCC assessment cycles all produced around 4.6-4.9C of global warming in 2100, whereas CMIP7’s high scenario only reaches 3.3C and has around half the cumulative CO2 emissions.
• The new “medium” scenario that is analogous to policies in place today reaches 2.9C in 2100, crossing 2C around 2050 and 3C around 2110, with a one-in-four chance of exceeding 4C by 2150.
• The lowest scenarios have shifted modestly upwards, as a future that avoids any overshoot of 1.5C is no longer considered plausible. The very-low scenario peaks at around 1.8C mid-century before falling back close to 1.5C by 2100.
• The updated socioeconomic assumptions underpinning the new scenarios describe a more crowded and less wealthy planet than the original SSPs, with the global human population now peaking at 10.1bn people around 2080 in the medium pathway and income per person in 2100 between 10% and 25% lower.
• Every scenario that limits warming leans heavily on carbon dioxide removal, with cumulative removals by 2150 ranging from 655GtCO2 in the very-low scenario to 2,360GtCO2 in low-to-negative scenario.

Article sections

• A new generation of scenarios
• Storylines and emissions levels
• No more ‘baseline’ scenarios and other changes
• Timescales and other changes
• A narrower range of future CO2 emissions
• What the new scenarios mean for future warming
• Crossing warming thresholds
• Carbon dioxide removal
• No single climate future
• Methodology

Article Contents Expand menu

• A new generation of scenarios
• Storylines and emissions levels
• No more ‘baseline’ scenarios and other changes
• Timescales and other changes
• A narrower range of future CO2 emissions
• What the new scenarios mean for future warming
• Crossing warming thresholds
• Carbon dioxide removal
• No single climate future
• Methodology

A new generation of scenarios

To simulate how human activity could shape the climate of the future, climate modellers must estimate future levels of “radiative forcings” – the external drivers that cause global warming. These include atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, air pollutants and land-use changes.

Given that no one knows how the future will unfold, modellers use a handful of scenarios that span a wide range of plausible outcomes.

The Scenario Model Intercomparison Project (ScenarioMIP) coordinates the development and running of emissions scenarios for climate models used in IPCC reports. 

In April 2026, high-level details about the new set of scenarios for CMIP7 were published in the journal Geoscientific Model Development (GMD).  

On 1 September, the underlying emissions data was released into the public domain by the ScenarioMIP team. 

There are seven new CMIP7 scenarios designed to drive model simulations for AR7. The first model runs took place in spring 2026 and initial results are expected later this year.

The previous SSP scenarios were starting to show their age. Finalised in 2015-17 using historical data ending in 2015, several years projected by the SSP scenarios were already in the past by the time AR6 concluded in 2021. Meanwhile, the world had changed considerably. 

(For a full guide to the SSPs, see Carbon Brief‘s 2018 explainer.)

Storylines and emissions levels

The most visible change in the new generation of scenarios is their names. Where the SSPs combined five socioeconomic “storylines” with radiative forcing targets (SSP1-2.6, SSP5-8.5, etc), the CMIP7 scenarios are named simply for the emissions trajectory that they follow.

The table below summarises the seven scenarios and the integrated assessment model (IAM) that produced each “marker” run – in other words, the specific IAM run used to generate the scenario that, in turn, will be used by CMIP7 climate models. IAMs run simulations of how the future energy system and emissions may evolve under different assumptions around socioeconomics, future technology costs and climate policy.

The table below also details how the scenario fares against a number of key metrics assessed by Carbon Brief, including CO2 emissions and warming outcomes. 

(For more on Carbon Brief’s approach, see: Methodology.).

ScenarioMarker IAMUnderlying SSPEmissions pathwayNet CO2 in 2100 (GtCO2/yr)Cumulative CO2, 2024-2100 (GtCO2)Warming in 2100 (C vs 1850-1900)High (H)GCAM 8sSSP3Emissions as high as plausible with policy rollback553,8203.3 (2.6-4.4)High-to-low (HL)WITCH 6.0SSP5High to mid-century, then net-zero CO2 by 2100-12,5662.8 (2.1-4.0)Medium (M)IMAGE 3.4SSP2Current policies frozen at 2025 levels342,8142.9 (2.2-3.9)Medium-low (ML)COFFEE 1.6SSP2Medium until 2040, then decline to net-zero CO2 by 2100-91,7572.3 (1.7-3.3)Low (L)MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 2.1SSP2Aims to keep warming likely below 2C-96731.8 (1.3-2.7)Very-low (VL)REMIND-MAgPIE 3.5-4.11SSP11.5C with as little overshoot as plausible-63101.6 (1.1-2.5)Low-to-negative (LN)AIM 3.0SSP21.5C with higher overshoot, then net-negative greenhouse gases-253841.7 (1.2-2.5)

Warming values are medians (with the 5-95% range) from the 841-member FaIR ensemble used in this article (see: Methodology); the marker model assignments come from the ScenarioMIP database. Note that scenario names in the database differ from the official CMIP7 names (for example, the high-to-low scenario appears as “SSP5 – Medium-Low Emissions_a”).

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Each of the new scenarios is built on a set of updated SSP storylines similar to those used in the original SSP scenarios. These include assumptions about future population, technological and economic growth, as well as potential for international cooperation that shape the resulting emissions pathways. The socioeconomic assumptions underlying these revised SSPs were updated in 2024 with new population and economic projections. 

Most of the new emissions scenarios are now based on the “middle-of-the-road” SSP2 that assumes current socioeconomic trends broadly continue, with only one scenario using each of SSP1 (“sustainability”), SSP3 (“regional rivalry”) and SSP5 (“fossil-fuelled development”). None of the new scenarios uses SSP4 (“inequality”). 

The solid lines in the figure below show updated global human population, GDP and GDP per capita values in CMIP7 (solid lines), compared to the original SSPs from CMIP’s sixth phase (CMIP6), shown by the dashed lines.

World population (left), GDP (centre) and GDP per capita (right) for SSPs 1-5 in the original 2013-era SSP database (dashed) and the 2024 update (solid). Note that the updated SSP1 and SSP5 population curves effectively overlap. GDP is shown in 2017 US dollars PPP, with the original converted from 2005 US dollars using the US GDP deflator (x1.235). Data from the IIASA SSP database; chart by Carbon Brief.

The change in socioeconomic assumptions is substantial. Global population was revised upward in nearly every scenario, with the updated SSP2 projecting there will be 9.9 billion people in 2100 – an increase of 1 billion people compared to the 2013-era SSP. 

GDP was revised downward in the high-end growth scenarios (SSP1 and SSP5), slightly upward in SSP3 and SSP4 and was largely unchanged in SS2. 

The combination of these changes means that income per person in 2100 is around 10-25% lower in most scenarios, with only SSP3 and SSP4 seeing mostly unchanged income per capita. 

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In short, the socioeconomic world underlying the new scenarios is somewhat more crowded and less wealthy per person than the one the SSPs originally imagined.

Another notable change is the shift in the SSP that underlies the highest future emissions scenario. 

In the original SSPs, the “very high” SSP5-8.5 scenario was based on SSP5, while the new “high” scenario in CMIP7 is based on SSP3. 

The GMD study explains that this is because IAM teams that developed the scenarios found that SSP3 and SSP5 variants produced similar emissions. They judged that the “fragmented” SSP3 world – which is characterised by large challenges to adaptation – to be more relevant for exploring high-end risks.

No more ‘baseline’ scenarios and other changes

In another important change, the authors of the CMIP7 scenarios decided to eliminate “baseline” scenarios that assumed a world without any climate policy. These scenarios were previously used as a counterfactual against which to compare climate-changed worlds.

Instead, the range of future emissions scenarios starts with current policies and explores ways that they could be strengthened, weakened, or kept the same. The high scenario explores a plausible “rollback of current mitigation policies“. 

The medium scenario, by contrast, extends climate policies officially implemented as of 2025, without assuming countries achieve their Paris Agreement pledges – known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – or net-zero targets that are not yet backed by legislation. 

In their GMD paper, the authors of the CMIP7 scenarios emphasise that the medium scenario “should not be considered as a ‘most likely’ scenario”, but that it can provide a benchmark against which the effect of future policy strengthening or weakening can be measured. It is roughly analogous in its emissions levels to the old SSP2-4.5 scenario.

The new low scenario explores a world where climate policy is rapidly strengthened and warming by 2100 is limited to below 2C. This makes it analogous to the old SSP1-2.6 scenario. 

The very-low scenario limits global warming to around 1.5C by 2100, similar to the old SSP1-1.9 scenario. However, it involves a greater degree of overshoot mid-century, reflecting the fact that global emissions did not begin to rapidly decline in 2020 as envisioned by SSP1-1.9. As the authors of the GMD ScenarioMIP paper point out: “At this point of time, some overshoot of the 1.5C seems unavoidable.”

In addition, there are a number of scenarios that start on one path before undertaking rapid mitigation. These high-to-low, medium-to-low and low-to-negative scenarios are intended to explore futures where mitigation is further delayed, followed by a rapid turn-around later in the century.

The scenario developers noted that there is no specific likelihood or probabilities assigned to any scenario, but rather only a judgement that all are within the realm of plausibility given where the world is today. They also said that “there might be potential futures outside the ScenarioMIP scenario range”.

Timescales and other changes

In addition to the shift away from baseline scenarios, there are three other notable design changes made in CMIP7. 

First, CMIP7 models will be driven by emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, rather than set atmospheric concentrations. 

In every previous generation of models, the ScenarioMIP experiments required that modelling groups simulate future climate using the same set of CO2 concentrations. For CMIP7, models with an interactive carbon cycle are asked to run in “emissions-driven” mode for CO2, calculating atmospheric concentrations themselves based on emissions. 

This is a significant improvement. It means that the substantial uncertainty in carbon-cycle feedbacks will now show up directly in the range of projected warming, rather than being overlooked. (The change applies to CO2 only; methane, nitrous oxide and halocarbons remain prescribed as concentrations.) 

Second, emissions match observations up to 2023. IAM modellers were asked to stay close to observed trends up to 2025 to avoid emissions diverging from reality before models were run. Scenario differences only open up after 2026, avoiding an earlier problem of scenarios diverging from reality years before the models were even run.

Finally, the period over which models are being run has been extended from 2100 to 2150. This is important as the world is already more than a quarter of the way through the 21st century. 

The extended model runs out to 2150 will provide a more thorough exploration of the warming that people born in the coming decades may experience within their lifetimes. 

In addition, all scenarios have extensions to 2500 where temperatures are eventually stabilised. These allow scientists to explore changes to long-term Earth-system processes, such as ice sheets and sea level, as well as whether warming is reversible. 

A narrower range of future CO2 emissions

Overall, the new scenarios provide a notably more narrow range of future CO2 emissions than the SSP scenarios used in CMIP6. 

The figure below shows net global CO2 emissions (combining fossil-fuel and land-use emissions) for the seven new scenarios, alongside the five SSP scenarios used for climate model runs in CMIP6 (e.g. SSP1-1.9, SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5).

Net global CO2 emissions (GtCO2/yr) in the seven CMIP7 scenarios (solid lines, coloured) and the CMIP6-era SSP scenarios (dashed) for the period from 1990 to 2100. CMIP7 scenarios are harmonised to 2023, while SSP scenarios (from RCMIP) were harmonised to 2015. Data from the ScenarioMIP database and RCMIP; chart by Carbon Brief.

At the bottom of the range, the new scenarios closely track their predecessors: the very-low scenario reaches net-zero CO2 around mid-century much like SSP1-1.9, while the low scenario lands close to SSP1-2.6. 

The chart below shows total emissions for the same scenarios for the period 2024-2100.

Cumulative global CO2 emissions (GtCO2) between 2024 and 2100 in the seven CMIP7 scenarios (solid colours) and the CMIP6-era SSPs (light colours). Data from the ScenarioMIP database and RCMIP; chart by Carbon Brief.

The lowest emissions scenarios now have somewhat higher total emissions, reflecting the failure of the world to rapidly reduce emissions after 2020 that occurred in the lower SSP emissions scenarios, such as SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2.6. The very-low scenario results in 310bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) cumulative emissions between 2024 and 2100, compared to around 110GtCO2 in SSP1-1.9.

At the top end, the change is particularly dramatic. The high scenario in CMIP7 reaches 55GtCO2 per year in 2100. The previous high scenario, SSP5-8.5, by contrast, reached around 126GtCO2 per year in 2100. 

In cumulative terms – which is what matters most for global warming – high reaches around 3,820GtCO2 over 2024-2100, half the roughly 7,600GtCO2 of SSP5-8.5 and about three-quarters of the 5,140GtCO2 of SSP3-7.0.

To put it another way: the top of the new scenario range sits between SSP2-4.5 and SSP3-7.0 in cumulative emissions terms, which is territory that CMIP6 treated as its middle ground.

To make the scale of this shift clear, Carbon Brief analysed the CO2 emissions trajectories in each of the prior generations of high-end emissions scenarios, using the same simple climate model – FaIR – to calculate future warming.

Fossil CO2 emissions relative to 1850-1900 for the highest scenario of each climate modelling generation: SRES A1FI (CMIP3, used in AR4), RCP8.5 (CMIP5, AR5), SSP5-8.5 (CMIP6, AR6) and CMIP7’s high, all run through AR6-calibrated FaIR ensemble. Data: SRES database v1.1, RCMIP v5.1, ScenarioMIP database; chart by Carbon Brief.

Below, four different generations of emissions scenarios are examined. The SRES scenarios were originally published in 2000 and used in the IPCC’s third (2001) and fourth (2007) assessment reports (and the corresponding CMIP3 model runs). The RCPs were developed in the early 2010s and used in the IPCC fifth assessment report (AR5; 2013) and CMIP5, while the SSPs were developed in the late 2010s and used in the IPCC AR6 report and CMIP6.

Over the past two decades, the highest emissions scenarios all resulted in comparable amounts of warming in 2100: SRES A1FI (the highest SRES scenario) reached 4.6C in 2100 (5-95% range; 3.5-6.1C), RCP8.5 reached 4.9C (3.7-6.5C) and SSP5-8.5 reached 4.6C (3.5-6.2C). 

(RCP8.5 edges out its successor despite lower CO2 emissions because it assumed considerably more methane and nitrous oxide.) 

Global mean surface temperature change in 2100 relative to 1850-1900 (medians and 5-95% ranges) for the highest scenario of each climate modelling generation: SRES A1FI (CMIP3, used in AR4), RCP8.5 (CMIP5, AR5), SSP5-8.5 (CMIP6, AR6) and CMIP7’s high, all run through AR6-calibrated FaIR ensemble. Data: SRES database v1.1, RCMIP v5.1, ScenarioMIP database; chart by Carbon Brief.

CMIP7’s high scenario comes in remarkably lower, at 3.3C (2.6-4.4C).

The downward revision of future emissions in CMIP7 reflects two key changes since RCP8.5 was published back in 2011. First, the plausible baseline of a repeal of current policy has fallen. Cheap solar, wind and batteries, a global plateau in coal use and more than $2tr per year in clean-energy investment mean that a rollback in climate policy would not result in coal deployment levels assumed in the RCP8.5 scenario.

The GMD study states that CMIP6’s high-emission levels “have become implausible, based on trends in the costs of renewables, the emergence of climate policy and recent emission trends”. 

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s recent factcheck of false claims around the retirement of the SSP5-8.5 emissions scenario. Also see Carbon Brief’s recent interview with Prof Detlef van Vuuren, a key architect of both the old SSPs and new scenarios.)

Second, part of the apparent decline reflects a correction of how scenarios are communicated – rather than real-world progress. The old high-end scenarios always represented an estimate of worst-case scenarios at the time, rather than likely outcomes. 

Genuine progress in reducing emissions probably accounts for around 0.7C of the roughly 1.7C gap between SSP5-8.5 and today’s current-policy trajectory, with the remainder reflecting that the baseline was never particularly likely.

What the new scenarios mean for future warming

To compare warming outcomes across scenario generations on a like-for-like basis, Carbon Brief ran both the seven CMIP7 scenarios and the CMIP6 SSP emission scenarios through the same simple climate model. 

(This is FaIR v2.2, using the 841-member ensemble calibrated and constrained to match the assessment of climate sensitivity in IPCC AR6, historical warming and ocean heat uptake). 

These values may differ from the ultimate results that are found by CMIP7 climate models, but give a sneak peak of what those results may look like when they become available.

Median warming relative to 1850-1900 for the seven CMIP7 scenarios, with observations to 2025 (black) and the 5-95% ensemble range shaded for the medium and low scenarios. Dashed lines show warming between 2100 and 2150. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The seven scenarios produce warming in 2100, relative to pre-industrial (1850-1900), that ranges from 1.6C (with a 5-95% range of 1.1-2.5C) in the very-low scenario to 3.3C (2.6-4.4C) in high, with the current-policy medium scenario reaching 2.9C (2.2-3.9C). Warming also continues after 2100 in both the medium and high scenarios.

The figure below shows the range of 2100 warming (5th to 95th percentile) relative to the preindustrial period expected in each of the old SSP scenarios and the new CMIP7 ones, along with a central estimate (white dots).

Warming in 2100 for CMIP7 scenarios and CMIP6 SSPs run through the identical FaIR ensemble (medians and 5-95% ranges). Chart by Carbon Brief.

The largest changes are, unsurprisingly, at the top. CMIP7’s high scenario (3.3C in 2100) produces less warming than SSP3-7.0 (3.7C in the same ensemble) and far less than SSP5-8.5 (4.7C). 

The entire CMIP6 “high” tier (e.g. SSP5-8.5 and SSP3-7.0) now sits above anything in the new scenario set, at least up to 2100. Extended beyond 2100, however, high keeps climbing towards levels the previous extreme scenarios reached earlier.

At the low end, the picture is more similar. The very-low scenario (1.6C in 2100) lands close to SSP1-1.9 (1.5C) and low (1.8C) is essentially indistinguishable from SSP1-2.6 (1.8C) in 2100. 

However, the new low scenario involves more rapid late-century emissions reductions and greater amounts of carbon removal than its SSP analogue, while the very-low scenario involves greater overshoot of 1.5C mid-century.

Crossing warming thresholds

In addition to calculating 2100 and 2150 warming, Carbon Brief has calculated the likelihood of passing different global warming levels (2C, 2.5C, 3C, 4C and 5C) over time in the new CMIP7 scenarios. 

The chart below uses the IPCC approach of calculating the crossing year based on a 20-year average, rather than when a single year exceeds the warming level.

Share of the 841-member FaIR climate model runs that exceed each warming level by year under the medium (top) and high (bottom) scenarios. Marked years show the median IPCC-convention (20-year average) crossing; percentages show the chance of exceeding each level by 2150. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Under the medium scenario, which reflects a world where current policies are maintained, passing 1.5C is essentially locked in. 

Most models cross the threshold by the late 2020s or early 2030s. The 2C limit is crossed around 2050 on average and 3C by around 2110. The chance of exceeding 4C is around one-in-four by 2150, but, ultimately, rises to roughly 50% if emissions continue after that point.

Under the high scenario, 2C arrives in the 2040s, 3C in the 2080s and the chance of exceeding 4C by 2150 is around 60% (and around 95% by 2300). Even 5C is reached by 2150 in roughly 20% of climate model simulations.

The lower scenarios tell a different story. In the very-low scenario, the chance that peak warming (which the IPCC determines using a 20-year average of warming) ever exceeds 1.5C is around 90%. This reflects the fact that passing 1.5C is almost unavoidable at this point. 

However, the chance of surpassing 2C sits at around 30% and the scenario has warming falling after mid-century as more CO2 is removed from the atmosphere than is added. 

Carbon dioxide removal

Every scenario that has global warming peaking and declining requires pulling CO2 back out of the atmosphere. Otherwise, warming from CO2 emissions will persist for millennia. 

CO2 removal (CDR) remains one of the few levers available to reduce future temperatures – particularly given additional warming caused by cuts to aerosol pollution. 

The chart below shows the total CDR deployment in each of the different scenarios by year, reflecting the sum of both land-based and engineered approaches (top), as well as the total CDR deployment between 2024 and 2150 (bottom).

Total carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the CMIP7 scenarios (solid) and their extensions (dashed), including both “engineered” and “novel” methods (bioenergy and carbon capture and storage (BECCS), direct air capture (DAC), enhanced weathering, biochar) plus land-based removals (the net land-use sink plus soil carbon management), along with with cumulative CDR for 2024-2150. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Every scenario that deeply cuts global emissions in CMIP7 also involves a large amount of CDR. 

The low-to-negative scenario pulls a cumulative 2,360GtCO2 out of the atmosphere by 2150, roughly 60 years of today’s emissions run in reverse. 

The high-to-low scenario has around 1,480GtCO2 cumulative CDR, medium-low has 1,450GtCO2 and low has 1,360GtCO2. 

Even the very-low scenario, which seeks to minimise CDR use, requires 655GtCO2 of removals between 2024 and 2150.

The degree to which scenarios rely on “engineered” removals – such as the use of biochar or direct air capture – or land-based removals – including afforestation and reforestation – ranges  across models. 

In the low scenario, roughly one-third of the removals is from the land “sink”, while low-to-negative relies almost entirely on engineered methods, with direct air capture alone reaching around 16GtCO2 per year by 2100.

The chart below shows the deployment of engineered removals by year (top), as well as the total engineered CDR used between 2024 and 2150 (bottom). The lower plot also includes a breakdown between the portion of CDR that requires geologic storage (e.g. DAC and BECCS) and the portion that does not (e.g. enhanced weathering and biochar) and compares the total to a recent “prudent” total CO2 storage limit published in the scientific literature.

(For more on limits to carbon storage capacity, see Carbon Brief’s 2025 guest post.)

Engineered and novel CO2 removal only, with the cumulative BECCS and direct air capture component – the technologies requiring geological storage – compared against the “prudent” 1,460GtCO2 (range 1,290-2,710GtCO2) geologic storage limit set out in Gidden et al. (2025). Chart by Carbon Brief.

The amount of CDR going toward geological storage is most highest in the low-to-negative scenario, which injects around 1,750GtCO2 of BECCS and direct-air-capture CO2 underground by 2150. 

The high-to-low and low scenarios each commit around 800GtCO2 to storage by 2150. This is within the range of available geologic storage, but would require that the storage industry handles more CO2 than the mass of oil currently moved by the fossil-fuel industry. 

That said, there are other potential CDR approaches – such as enhanced rock weathering, surficial mineralisation and ocean alkalinity enhancement – that do not require injection of CO2 into geologic formations. In-situ mineralisation approaches that inject CO2 into alkaline rock formations such as basalt or peridotite could also open up more potential CO2 storage.

It is worth noting that the amount of CDR deployed in these scenarios would require planetary-scale engineering at the cost of trillions of dollars, while many of the engineered CDR approaches are still relatively early-stage technologies. 

No single climate future

The goal of scenarios is to span a range of possible futures. While it may be tempting to treat current climate and energy policies – and the medium scenario – as a forecast, there is no reason to expect that they will not change in the future. 

It is likely that policies will continue to be strengthened, as has been the case over the past two decades. However, they may also be weakened if national priorities or politics change, as has happened in the US during the two terms of the Trump administration.

In the new CMIP7 scenarios there is no “business-as-usual” scenario, but rather a narrower range of futures than was available in CMIP6, reflecting greater clarity among scientists on where the world is heading in terms of future energy use and emissions. 

The fact that the worst-case scenarios of the past have become increasingly implausible is good news. However, this is tempered by the fact that the very-low emission scenarios have, in turn, become harder to achieve given that global emissions have yet to decline.

There is also real uncertainty in the climate-system response to emissions. This is due to uncertainty around how sensitive the climate is to a build-up of CO2 in the atmosphere, as well as how the carbon cycle will respond to emissions. 

The CMIP7 medium scenario – which has a central estimate of 2.9C of warming by 2100 – still has around a 3% chance of reaching 4C by that date. If emissions continue, those odds increase to 25% by 2150. This remains far outside anything resembling a safe outcome for the climate system.

The scenarios are now being run using the new CMIP7 models, whose emissions-driven runs will fold carbon-cycle uncertainty directly into projections. These projections will subsequently be analysed in the reports of AR7. 

Ultimately, it will be decisions made by governments, businesses and individuals that decide which of these seven futures become closest to reality.

Methodology

Emissions scenarios shown in this article are the seven CMIP7 ScenarioMIP scenarios set out in van Vuuren et al. (2026), harmonised to observed 2023 emissions, with rule-based extensions to 2500 generated using the FLEX methodology. Emissions through 2100 match the ScenarioMIP database; extension trajectories are indicative and may differ from the final published extensions.

Temperature projections use FaIR v2.2 with the fair-calibrate v1.4.5 constrained ensemble (841 members set out in Smith et al. (2024), which matches the AR6 assessed climate sensitivity (ensemble ECS median 3C, 5-95% 2.0-5.1C), historical warming and ocean heat content. 

Historical emissions (1750-2022) use the FaIR historical emissions dataset, with scenario emissions spliced in after 2023. 

Solar and volcanic forcing are updated through 2025 from the Climate Indicator forcing timeseries; future volcanic forcing ramps to the 1850-2021 climatological background by 2035 (following the CMIP7 protocol) and solar forcing follows a SOLARIS-HEPPA-derived cycle projection to 2300. 

All warming is expressed relative to 1850-1900.

SSP comparisons run the RCMIP-harmonised CMIP6 scenario emissions through the FaIR ensemble, which yields 2081-2100 warming 0.1-0.3C below the AR6-assessed values at the high end (e.g. SSP5-8.5: 4.2C vs 4.4C assessed), reflecting differences between the AR6 assessment and the FaIR configurations used here. Updating the volcanic dataset to use CMIP7 values (which revises the eruption-rich 1850-1900 baseline period) raises all reported anomalies by 0.03-0.05C.

For CDR, the scenario database reports the technology split (for example, BECCS, direct air capture, enhanced weathering, biochar, ocean-based, soil carbon management). Agriculture, forestry and other land-use  (AFOLU) removals are available only as a net flux, so are shown as the net sink where negative. Soil-carbon management is grouped with land-based rather than engineered removal, and the geological storage comparison uses BECCS plus direct air capture only. 

The figure showing high-end scenarios for the past four CMIP generations runs SRES A1FI through the same ensemble using the A1G MiniCAM model from the SRES database v1.1, spliced onto historical emissions at 2000, and covering CO2 (fossil and land use), methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur; SRES-era ozone-precursor projections (nitrous oxide, carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds) lie outside the calibrated range of FaIR, so RCP8.5 values are used instead. RCP8.5 uses RCMIP v5.1 emissions, with 13 minor halogenated gases absent from the RCP database following SSP5-8.5.

Related Guest post: How CMIP7 will shape the next wave of climate science 22.05.2026 Climate modelling Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts 29.04.2026 Climate modelling Limiting global warming to 2C would not ‘rule out’ extreme impacts 25.03.2026 Climate modelling State of the climate: 2025 in top-three hottest years on record as ocean heat surges 14.01.2026 Climate modelling

The post Explainer: The CMIP7 emissions scenarios – and how they explore future climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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More than 40% of children under the age of 10 globally are already experiencing at least 20 additional “heat-stress days” due to climate change.

This is according to a new attribution study, published in Science Advances, which combines climate models with demographic data to assess the age groups and regions that are exposed to the most hot, humid days.

The study finds that children up to the age of nine already face more additional heat-stress days globally as a result of climate change than any other age group. 

It adds that south Asia, southeast Asia and west Africa are recording the greatest childhood exposure to dangerous levels of humid heat – largely because these regions have a rapidly growing population with the highest proportion of young children.

As the climate warms, children will continue to be more exposed to heat stress than any other age group, the paper warns.

The lead author of the study tells Carbon Brief that the findings should inform discussions about climate justice, noting that children in developing countries “have contributed the least to historical greenhouse gas emissions”. 

Humid heat

High temperatures can be deadly. For example, the heatwaves that swept across Europe in the summer of 2026 have been linked to tens of thousands of “excess deaths”.

A prominent 2021 study found that children born in the 21st century will be exposed to more extreme weather events in their lifetimes than their parents and grandparents. 

Four years later, a study conducted by scientists from the same team found that more than half of children born in 2020 – around 62 million people – will experience “unprecedented lifetime exposure” to heatwaves, even if warming is limited to 1.5C.

Now, the latest research from the same team finds that children already face greater  exposure to dangerous levels of humid heat than adults as a result of human-caused climate change.

Extreme heat is particularly dangerous when combined with high humidity. In hot weather, the human body produces sweat to cool itself down. However, as humidity increases, sweating becomes less effective.

The study uses indoor wet-bulb globe temperature – a measure of temperature that takes humidity into account – to calculate heat stress. It defines a “heat-stress day” as any day with a wet-bulb globe temperature above 28C, as this is considered the threshold for “moderate heat stress”

The authors then use climate models to simulate global temperature patterns in the present-day climate. (The authors use the climate of 2023, in which human activity has caused 1.3C of warming, to represent the “present-day”.)

They then count the number of heat-stress days that each country records on average, per year. The authors then repeat this exercise, simulating a pre-industrial climate without human-caused warming.

By comparing the number of heat-stress days in the present-day climate with the number in a pre-industrial climate, the authors can determine how many extra heat-stress days were driven by climate change. They refer to these as “extra” or “attributable” heat-stress days.

The authors find that “low-latitude” countries, located in the tropics, record the most extra heat-stress days.

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For example, the paper finds that people living in Côte d’Ivoire currently face 112 heat-stress days every year. It adds that around half of these are due to human-caused climate change. 

In contrast, Germany sees only 0.1 heat-stress days per year in today’s climate on average, which is largely attributable to human-caused climate change.

Rosa Pietroiusti, a PhD student at Vrije Universiteit Brussel and lead author on the study, explains why this number may seem lower than expected.

She tells Carbon Brief that the paper “really focuses on humid heat, at levels that are relatively rarely felt in Europe”. She adds:

“Our data also doesn’t capture the urban heat island effect, due to the resolution of the data we use, which also would lead to underestimations of heat stress locally, and lead to a mismatch with what people are experiencing at local scales, particularly in cities.”

Inequality

Extreme heat affects some people more severely than others. Children, people over 65 and those with pre-existing medical conditions or certain disabilities are among the most vulnerable. This is because their bodies are less able to regulate their temperature. 

The authors use gridded demographic data to determine the age structure of each country. From this, they calculate how many people from each age cohort are exposed to extra heat days as a result of climate change. 

The research finds that globally, 583 million children under the age of 10 already live through at least 20 attributable heat days every year. This accounts for 44% of all children in this age bracket. 

In comparison, 190 million people aged 60-69 face at least 20 attributable heat days per year, accounting for 30% of this age cohort.

The authors find that children face the greatest exposure to humid heat for two main reasons. 

First, there are more young people alive today than older people, with 1.3 billion children aged under 10 in the world, compared to 0.6 billion people aged 60-69.

Second, they find that countries in Africa and Asia typically have rapidly growing populations with more young children. In contrast, many countries in the northern hemisphere – which are typically cooler – have older populations.

The map below shows how many extra stress heat days each country currently faces as a result of human-caused climate change. Darker reds indicate a higher number of attributable heat days. The blue circles show the percentage of the population under the age of 10, with larger circles indicating a higher percentage.

The number of extra heat days faced by the global population at present-day warming levels as a result of human-caused climate change. Source: Pietroiusti et al (2026). Warming world

The authors also repeat their analysis for a 1.5C and 2C warmer world. They use population estimates from the SSP2 scenario, which projects that the world’s population will peak at more than nine billion in the second half of the 21st century, with most growth occurring in low-latitude regions – especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

The research finds that, in today’s climate, 11% of all under 10s currently experience 100 or more extra heat-stress days per year due to climate change. In worlds warmed by 1.5C and 2C, the percentage rises to 13% and 23%, respectively.

In contrast, only 6% of all people aged 60-69 currently face 100 or more extra heat-stress days each year due to climate change. This number rises to 9% and 17% for 1.5C and 2C worlds, respectively. 

These results are shown in the plot below. The three rows represent the climates of 2023 (top), a 1.5C world (middle) and a 2C world (bottom). The columns show different age cohorts, from the oldest on the left to the youngest on the right.

Each circle contains 100 coloured dots, with each dot representing 1% of the age cohort. 

The colour of the dot represents exposure to annual heat-stress day, with darker dots indicating more heat-stress days. Grey dots mean that people experience fewer than one extra heat-stress day per year due to human-caused climate change, while black dots mean more than 150 extra heat-stress days due to climate change.

The figure shows that higher warming levels expose more people to heat stress and that younger cohorts tend to be worst affected.

For example, the top-right circle represents heat stress for under 10s in the present-day climate. Three of these dots are coloured black, indicating that 3% faced at least 150 attributable heat-stress days in 2023.

Attributable days of heat stress for different age cohorts (columns), at different warming levels (rows). Each circle contains 100 coloured dots, with each dot representing 1% of the age cohort. Darker dots indicate more heat-stress days. Source: Pietroiusti et al (2026).

Pietroiusti tells Carbon Brief the study uses wet-bulb globe temperature because it is a “well-established heat stress metric”. However, she notes that it was not “explicitly defined to focus on children”. She continues:

“A really important step forward in the research community would be to link up climate science and health science experts to do research on what metrics are really most representative of, for example, health impacts and educational impacts that children will be suffering.”

Vulnerability

Dr Qinqin Kong, a postdoctoral researcher at the departments of medicine and health policy at Stanford University, who was not involved in the study, praises its “robust” methodology.

He tells Carbon Brief that the research provides “a timely quantitative evidence for discussions of climate justice, children’s rights and intergenerational equity”. 

However, Kong suggests that the paper “may overstate the contrast between children and the elderly and underestimate the relative burden of older adults”.

He says:

“The elderly may also be more vulnerable due to their social circumstances. Children often benefit from parental supervision and caregiving, whereas many older adults live alone, have limited mobility and face barriers to accessing cooling or emergency assistance during heat events.”

Kong also notes that “people and societies in the mid-latitudes [for example, across much of Europe and North America] are less adapted to heat”, which may make them vulnerable to its impacts.

For example, he says that Europe “shows substantially stronger relative risk of heat mortality likely due to less heat-acclimatised populations, lower air conditioning prevalence and urban designs that don’t favour heat dissipation”.

Similarly, Dr Daniel Vecellio – a researcher at the University of Nebraska, who was not involved in the study – tells Carbon Brief that children are an “understudied cohort”. 

However, he says there is “reason for hope” because “children are typically pretty good behavioural adapters to extreme heat” and because people who are “chronically exposed to extreme heat” will “have a better chance at better acclimatisation”.

Pietroiusti tells Carbon Brief that global reporting on heatwaves is often skewed towards wealthier nations. 

For example, she notes that large-scale databases of disasters, such as EM-DAT, often underrepresent heatwaves in Africa, due in part to a lack of news coverage and formal reporting. She adds:

“Studies like this, which start from the climate data, can start to fill some of these gaps.”

She adds that the paper should inform discussions about climate justice, noting that children in developing countries, who are most severely affected by the increase in heat-stress days, “have contributed the least to historical greenhouse gas emissions”. 

Pietroiusti, R. et al. (2026) Age-specific exposure to human-induced increases in humid heat, Science Advances, doi:10.1126/sciadv.aeb3232

related Experts: Why carbon removal needs a ‘major scale up’ to return warming to 1.5C 19.06.2026 Carbon dioxide removal Guest post: How a record-high ‘energy imbalance’ is driving global warming 10.06.2026 Climate system Guest post: How declining cloudiness is accelerating global warming 26.03.2026 Climate system Mapped: How climate change affects extreme weather around the world 19.03.2026 Attribution

The post Climate change exposes 580 million children to 20 extra ‘heat-stress days’ every year appeared first on Carbon Brief.